2019 CO 91
Colo.2019Background
- On July 2, 2013, McRae sold 6.86 grams of methamphetamine and was later convicted of selling a schedule II controlled substance (class 3 felony).
- McRae was adjudicated a habitual criminal based on six prior felonies (dating 2000–2006), which, under the law in effect at the time of the triggering offense, produced a 64‑year habitual sentence.
- The General Assembly reclassified certain drug offenses effective October 1, 2013 (after McRae’s offense), reducing the statutory sentencing ranges for those crimes.
- At sentencing the trial court considered those post‑offense legislative amendments, concluded they “applie[d]” to McRae (despite their nonretroactive scope), found the 64‑year term grossly disproportionate, and imposed a 16‑year sentence.
- The court of appeals affirmed the inference of gross disproportionality but held the trial court had not retroactively applied the amendments and remanded for extended proportionality review.
- The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, held that courts may consider relevant post‑offense statutory amendments during an abbreviated proportionality review but may not apply them retroactively, and remanded for a new proportionality review with additional factual findings regarding the predicate offenses.
Issues
| Issue | People’s Argument | McRae’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether courts may consider statutory amendments enacted after the dates of triggering/predicate offenses (even if nonretroactive) during an abbreviated proportionality review | Courts should not consider post‑offense amendments that do not apply retroactively | Post‑offense amendments are relevant and should be considered in evaluating gravity/seriousness | Courts may consider relevant legislative amendments enacted after the offenses during an abbreviated proportionality review, even if they are not retroactive |
| Whether the trial court improperly applied the amendments retroactively when it sentenced McRae under the new scheme | The trial court unlawfully applied amendments retroactively and exceeded its authority | The trial court merely considered amendments and did not unlawfully apply them retroactively | The trial court in fact applied the amendments retroactively (contrary to law); that was error and required reversal |
| Whether the court of appeals erred by remanding for an extended proportionality review instead of ordering entry of the 64‑year sentence | The court of appeals should have ordered the 64‑year sentence be entered | Remand for extended review was appropriate | Moot after Supreme Court ordered remand for a new abbreviated proportionality review with factfinding |
| Whether narcotics (and related predicate) offenses remain per se grave or serious after statutory changes | Offenses remain per se grave/serious and permit abbreviated analysis | Legislative amendments may remove per se status; offenses require case‑specific analysis | Some drug offenses (per Wells‑Yates and Melton) are no longer per se grave/serious; trial court must make factual findings for each predicate offense to decide gravity/seriousness |
Key Cases Cited
- Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (framework for Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis)
- People v. Mershon, 874 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1994) (proportionality questions are legal issues reviewed de novo)
- Rutter v. People, 363 P.3d 183 (Colo. 2015) (distinguishing retroactivity of statutes from proportionality review)
- People v. Gaskins, 825 P.2d 30 (Colo. 1992) (trial court is best suited to make factual findings relevant to proportionality)
- People v. Stellabotte, 421 P.3d 174 (Colo. 2018) (prospective statutes are applied prospectively only)