v. Madrid, 2021 COA 70

Defendant Theodore Madrid was convicted of first-degree murder and child abuse; jury selection included Prospective Juror T, identified at trial as African-American.
During limited voir dire the prosecutor asked minimal questions of Prospective Juror T; the prosecutor then used a peremptory strike and the defense raised a Batson objection.
At trial the prosecutor gave three race-neutral reasons for the strike: the juror’s questionnaire provided little information, the parties had limited time to question him, and the juror appeared to have a hearing problem.
A division of the Court of Appeals reversed the initial Batson disposition, remanding for completion of the Batson analysis and directing the trial court to take additional evidence if requested.
On remand the prosecutor expanded and changed her explanations (claiming the juror was nonresponsive, disengaged, and did not want to be there); the trial court accepted those new demeanor-based reasons and denied Batson.
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred by considering and relying on post‑trial justifications the prosecution did not articulate at the original Batson proceeding, and reversed for a new trial.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether prosecution may introduce new race-neutral reasons on remand after stating reasons at trial	Remand permitted expansion of record; new reasons explain strike and are race-neutral	New justifications are after-the-fact and cannot be used to defeat a Batson challenge	Court: No — when prosecution stated reasons at trial, court may not rely on new justifications offered only on remand; reversal required
Whether trial court may sua sponte supply its own race-neutral reasons for the strike	Court can consider demeanor and other impressions in assessing plausibility	Court’s sua sponte reasons improperly substitute for prosecutor’s stated reasons and risk masking pretext	Court: Improper — trial court must assess prosecutor’s stated reasons, not invent its own
Whether shifting explanations indicate pretext	New, expanded reasons are legitimate clarifications based on refreshed memory	Shifts in rationale and timing suggest afterthought and pretext	Court: Shifting/ex post facto reasons raise strong inference of pretext and cannot be credited on remand
Whether remand order allowing additional evidence permits new justifications	Remand to take additional evidence allows fuller explanation and credibility assessment	Remand does not authorize the prosecution to invent reasons it did not give at trial to justify a prior strike	Court: Remand does not authorize retroactive justification; trial record’s original reasons control

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (prohibits race-based peremptory strikes; establishes three-step Batson framework)
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) (explains credibility focus at Batson step three)
Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005) (rejects after-the-fact justifications; prosecutor must state reasons contemporaneously and stand or fall on them)
Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008) (trial court’s Batson credibility determinations entitled to deference)
Valdez v. People, 966 P.2d 587 (Colo. 1998) (Colorado discussion of Batson burdens and standards)