v. Luna, 2020 COA 123

Jorge Luna, a juvenile at the time, stabbed an adult (J.P.); he later turned himself in and was direct-filed to district court under § 19-2-517 to be tried as an adult.
Luna testified he acted in self-defense after being assaulted; the jury acquitted him of intentional offenses (attempted first- and second-degree murder, first-degree assault) but convicted him of attempted reckless manslaughter and second-degree assault (heat of passion).
The trial court gave a lengthy, custom self-defense instruction that on its face (a) stated self-defense is not an affirmative defense for crimes requiring recklessness but (b) also told jurors they could consider self-defense evidence when determining recklessness and that a defendant who acted in self-defense cannot be found reckless—creating an internal contradiction.
Defense did not object at trial; appellate review was therefore for plain error. The court also refused a tendered "reasonable child" instruction proffered by Luna.
The Court of Appeals held the self-defense instruction was plainly erroneous and prejudicial (following the reasoning in People v. McClelland), reversed the convictions, and remanded for a new trial; it rejected Luna’s request for a separate "reasonable child" jury instruction and declined to reach asserted prosecutorial-misconduct and restitution claims.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court's self-defense instruction improperly handled self-defense in the context of crimes requiring recklessness	Instruction correctly told jurors self-defense is not an affirmative defense for recklessness, and permitted consideration of self-defense evidence in assessing culpable mental states	Instruction was contradictory: it both said self-defense "did not apply" to reckless offenses and also told jurors to consider self-defense evidence, undermining § 18-1-704(4) and precedent	Reversed for plain and prejudicial error; instruction was self-contradictory and likely misled jurors, requiring a new trial
Whether a juvenile is entitled to a "reasonable child" jury instruction for self-defense	J.D.B. does not require a juvenile-specific self-defense instruction; age and circumstances can be argued but statute and existing instruction suffice	Juvenile age should change the objective reasonableness standard to a "reasonable child" standard for self-defense	Denied; court may consider defendant's subjective belief and youth as part of totality of circumstances, but no separate "reasonable child" jury instruction is required
Prosecutorial misconduct and restitution claims	Prosecutor: arguments were harmless / restitution proper	Luna: prosecutorial misconduct occurred; restitution order improper	Court declined to address on appeal because issues likely to be revisited on retrial

People v. Pickering, 276 P.3d 553 (Colo. 2011) (holds self-defense is a traverse, not an affirmative defense, for crimes requiring recklessness)
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011) (child's age is relevant to custody analysis under Miranda)
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Miranda warnings and custody framework)
People v. Willner, 879 P.2d 19 (Colo. 1994) (self-defense requires actual belief and objective reasonableness)
Kaufman v. People, 202 P.3d 542 (Colo. 2009) (reasonableness of belief judged by totality of circumstances)
People v. Vasquez, 148 P.3d 326 (Colo. App. 2006) (defines reasonable person in self-defense context)
People v. Toler, 981 P.2d 1096 (Colo. App. 1998) (court may refuse instructions that ask only for a subjective test)
People v. Gilliland, 769 P.2d 477 (Colo. 1989) (legislature defines crimes and affirmative defenses)
People v. Beckett, 800 P.2d 74 (Colo. 1990) (separate "apparent necessity" instruction not required)