v. Lindsey, 2020 CO 21

William Lindsey was indicted for securities fraud and theft; the case lingered almost three years with multiple continuances and four defense attorneys.
Less than 48 business hours before trial, Lindsey’s attorney David Tyler filed a written motion under § 16-8.5-102(2)(b) certifying a good-faith doubt about competency and listing specific facts (client noncooperation, failure to produce documents, alleged delusional beliefs about experts/witnesses).
The factual allegations in the competency motion largely duplicated Tyler’s earlier, denied motion to withdraw; Lindsey was articulate at hearings and denied being incompetent.
The prosecutor offered that Lindsey’s probation officer would testify Lindsey was competent.
The trial court rejected Tyler’s competency motion as inadequate (not as a preliminary finding of competency) and proceeded to trial; Lindsey was convicted.
The court of appeals vacated the conviction for failure to follow the competency-evaluation procedure; the Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding the statute contains threshold requirements and trial courts may reject motions that lack adequate factual proffers.

Issue	People’s Argument	Lindsey’s Argument	Held
Whether § 16-8.5-102(2)(b) imposes threshold requirements for competency motions	Statute does not require an automatic evaluation; court should have discretion unless judge has reason to believe defendant is incompetent	A written motion with a good-faith certificate and specific facts automatically triggers the statutory preliminary-finding/evaluation procedure	The statute includes threshold requirements (written motion, good-faith certificate, specific facts). If those are not met, court may reject the motion as inadequate.
Whether trial courts may reject a competency motion based on an inadequate factual proffer	Trial courts retain discretion to reject motions that are conclusory or rest on irrelevant facts	Once motion complies with statutory form and alleges specific facts, the court must follow §16-8.5-103 procedures and cannot refuse to order evaluation	Trial courts may reject rare motions that rest on counsel’s inadequate proffer; here, court did not abuse discretion in rejecting Tyler’s motion.

People in Interest of W.P., 295 P.3d 514 (Colo. 2013) (discusses competency-procedure changes and abuse-of-discretion standard)
McCoy v. People, 442 P.3d 379 (Colo. 2019) (statutory construction; avoid interpretations producing absurd results)
People v. Diaz, 347 P.3d 621 (Colo. 2015) (court must apply statutes as written; do not add or subtract language)
Smith v. Exec. Custom Homes, Inc., 230 P.3d 1186 (Colo. 2010) (courts should not rewrite statutes to avoid undesirable outcomes)
Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n v. Martinez, 433 P.3d 22 (Colo. 2019) (statutory history may inform interpretation even where statute is unambiguous)