2019 COA 101
Colo. Ct. App.2019Background
- Victim J.F. alleged Hamilton drugged her at a bar, separated her from friends, moved her to an apartment while she was unconscious, and sexually assaulted her; Hamilton admitted intercourse but claimed it was consensual.
- Police downloaded contents of Hamilton’s and J.F.’s phones and generated electronic reports; the prosecution did not introduce the reports themselves or call the technicians who produced them.
- Detective Slay testified, based on his review of those reports, that neither phone contained texts from J.F. to Hamilton; defense disputed this because Hamilton testified J.F. had texted him.
- Defense objected to admission of testimony about J.F.’s phone (preserved) but not to initial questions about Hamilton’s phone (not preserved); the court admitted Slay’s testimony about the reports.
- The jury convicted Hamilton of one sexual-assault count and distribution; he was acquitted on other counts; conviction reversed and remanded for new trial because of erroneous admission of hearsay from the phone reports.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of testimony about phone reports (are reports hearsay?) | The testimony conveyed only the detective’s observations about his investigation, not hearsay of the reports. | Reports were hearsay because introduced to prove their content (no declarant excluded); admission violated hearsay rules and confrontation. | Reports were hearsay when human input/interpretation was involved; prosecutor failed to show they were purely machine-generated, so admission erred. |
| Hearsay within hearsay (Detective Slay testifying about tech unit’s report) | Slay’s testimony simply summarized police work and was permissible. | Slay’s testimony added a second layer of hearsay because he relayed the tech unit’s report without exception. | Slay’s testimony was hearsay within hearsay and inadmissible absent applicable exceptions; none were shown. |
| Authentication and reliability of machine-generated reports | The reports were accurate and reflected phone contents; counsel’s representations sufficed. | Prosecution failed to lay foundation: no proof machine/process/operator reliability or authenticity. | Prosecution did not establish reliability/authentication (operation, procedures, qualifications); foundation insufficient. |
| Admissibility of prior acts and jury instructions about prior conviction/acquittal | Other-act evidence was relevant to consent/modus operandi; jury may be informed of prior acquittal and conviction with limiting instructions. | Admission unduly prejudiced Hamilton; adding conviction language to acquittal instruction improperly highlighted conviction. | Other-act evidence admissible under Spoto and §16-10-301; adding "factually innocent" language to acquittal instruction was acceptable but including separate/duplicative conviction language in the acquittal instruction was error. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Buckner, 228 P.3d 245 (Colo. App.) (machine-generated records not hearsay when no human declarant)
- United States v. Hamilton, 413 F.3d 1138 (10th Cir. 2005) (automatically generated computer data is not hearsay)
- United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2007) (machine-generated information lacks a human declarant and thus is not hearsay)
- United States v. Cestnik, 36 F.3d 904 (10th Cir. 1994) (records involving human input can be hearsay)
- People v. Kinney, 187 P.3d 548 (Colo. 2008) (acquittal instruction principles; caution on juror speculation about prior trials)
- People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314 (Colo. 1990) (four-part test for admitting other-acts evidence under CRE 404(b))
- People v. Rath, 44 P.3d 1033 (Colo. 2002) (evaluating probative value and unfair prejudice of other-acts evidence)
- People v. Huehn, 53 P.3d 733 (Colo. App.) (authentication and admissibility analysis for computer printouts)