2021 COA 80
Colo. Ct. App.2021Background
- On the night in question, Cristobal Garcia aimed a handgun at Natalie Duran and her sister and fired three shots; no one was hit.
- Garcia was charged with three counts of attempted first-degree murder: one count (intent after deliberation) as to Duran and two counts (extreme indifference) as to Duran and her sister; lesser included reckless endangerment instructions were given.
- The jury convicted Garcia of attempted extreme indifference murder as to Duran (with a deadly-weapon finding) and convicted him of reckless endangerment as to the other counts (one reckless conviction merged).
- At trial the court declined defense-proposed jury language defining “universal malice” and instructed using the statutory language for extreme indifference murder.
- Garcia appealed, arguing (1) the court erred by refusing his “universal malice” definition, (2) the court’s voir dire analogies improperly explained reasonable doubt, and (3) the prosecutor committed misconduct (domestic-violence references and appeals to victim sympathy). The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court had to give a definitional instruction on “universal malice” | People: Statutory instruction sufficed; no special definition required. | Garcia: Court should have given his Longinotti-style definition to explain universal malice. | Affirmed: statutory instruction adequately conveyed modern meaning (a willingness to take life indiscriminately); no definitional instruction required. |
| Whether the court’s voir dire analogies (traffic/merging) lowered the reasonable-doubt burden | People: Any analogies were isolated, the correct instruction was given in full, and context shows no lowering of burden. | Garcia: Analogies trivialized reasonable doubt and risked reducing the prosecution’s burden. | Affirmed: analogies were fleeting, not emphasized, correct instructions were given later, and there was no reasonable likelihood jurors applied them unconstitutionally. |
| Whether prosecutor’s voir dire/opening references to “domestic violence” were improper | People: References were supported by charging documents and later evidence (cohabitation, shared children, facts supported domestic-violence inference). | Garcia: Prosecutor had no good-faith basis to inject a domestic-violence theme and improperly argued facts not admissible. | Affirmed: references were permissible given charging caption and admissible trial evidence; no plain error. |
| Whether prosecutor’s appeals to “do the right thing”/victim justice were reversible misconduct | People: Statements were brief, tied to evidence, and not so prejudicial as to warrant reversal. | Garcia: Prosecutor improperly appealed for a guilty verdict to do justice for victims. | Affirmed: claim unpreserved; under plain-error review any harm was minimal/harmless and not reversible. |
Key Cases Cited
- Longinotti v. People, 102 P. 165 (Colo. 1909) (historic formulation of “universal malice” as depravity to take life without caring who the victim is)
- People v. Jefferson, 748 P.2d 1223 (Colo. 1988) (interpreting statutory language and describing universal malice as aggravated recklessness/cold-bloodedness)
- Candelaria v. People, 148 P.3d 178 (Colo. 2006) (extreme indifference covers conduct evidencing willingness to take life indiscriminately)
- People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d 69 (Colo. 1981) (discussing extreme indifference and disregard of fatal risk)
- People v. Gallegos, 260 P.3d 15 (Colo. App. 2010) (statutory-language instructions generally sufficient)
- People v. Esparza-Treto, 282 P.3d 471 (Colo. App. 2011) (trial court has discretion on instruction wording; definitional instruction not required for common terms)