v. Galvan, 486 P.3d 313

Defendant Jose Luis Galvan got into a drunken confrontation on a party bus with S.M. and C.M.; allegations include taunts, threats, and a later physical assault in which C.M. suffered a broken nose and ankle.
Galvan was charged with multiple offenses; acquitted of charges involving S.M. but convicted of second-degree assault of C.M.
At trial the court gave the model self-defense instruction (COLJI-Crim. H:11) and, over Galvan’s objection, included the provocation exception to self-defense.
Galvan requested a separate “no duty to retreat” instruction; the court declined, relying on the model instruction’s language that no retreat was required.
During voir dire the prosecutor asked potential jurors about a “victim’s right to a fair trial,” prompting defense objections that were overruled.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether provocation instruction was authorized	Some evidence supported giving provocation instruction; prosecution defended the instruction	No evidence of provocation, so instruction improperly withdrew self-defense from jury	Court: Provocation instruction was authorized (some evidence); certain taunts were fighting words and could be considered for provocation.
Whether self-defense instruction should be individualized per victim	Single model instruction sufficed; jury instructed to treat each charge separately	Instruction was defective for not specifying which victim provoked	Court: No error; instructions tracked statute and model, and jury presumed to follow separate-charge instruction.
Whether a separate "no duty to retreat" instruction was required	Model instruction already informs jury there is no duty to retreat	Requested specific no-retreat instruction was necessary to avoid jury confusion	Court: No abuse of discretion in refusing separate instruction; model instruction covered no-duty-to-retreat principle.
Whether prosecutor may imply victims’ rights equal defendant’s during voir dire	Prosecutor’s voir dire comments were improper to the extent they equated victims’ rights with defendant’s constitutional rights	Remarks were proper or harmless; did not alter trial fairness	Court: Such implications are improper, but here any error was harmless given correct jury instructions and split verdicts.

Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (U.S. 2003) (some categories of speech, e.g., fighting words and true threats, are unprotected)
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (U.S. 1942) (definition and social-value rationale for regulation of fighting words)
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (U.S. 1971) (test for words likely to provoke violent reaction; contrasting protected vs. fighting words)
People v. Silva, 987 P.2d 909 (Colo. App. 1999) (provocation instruction authorized when defendant’s conduct or words were intended to provoke)
People v. Castillo, 2018 CO 62 (Colo. 2018) (assumed standard that "some evidence" is sufficient to authorize an exception instruction)
Arko v. People, 183 P.3d 555 (Colo. 2008) (elements and operation of judicial estoppel)