2019 COA 172
Colo. Ct. App.2019Background
- Timothy Williams was a lieutenant with El Paso County Sheriff’s Office (EPSO); after reporting his retirement eligibility he was demoted in November 2016 and resigned to avoid pension consequences; a younger employee replaced him.
- Williams filed age-discrimination charges with the CCRD/EEOC and later alleged EPSO retaliated by falsely claiming he took accreditation documents in response to a CORA request.
- Williams sued in district court under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) for age discrimination and retaliation, seeking front pay and compensatory damages.
- EPSO moved to dismiss, arguing Williams failed to exhaust administrative remedies on retaliation and that compensatory damages and front pay are legal remedies barred by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA).
- The district court allowed front pay and compensatory damages; EPSO sought interlocutory review. This appeal addressed whether CADA remedies (front pay, compensatory damages) are barred by the CGIA and whether CADA’s 2013 amendments affect that analysis.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Are compensatory damages for an age-discrimination claim under CADA barred by the CGIA? | Williams: CADA’s remedies (including 2013 compensatory damages) are equitable and not subject to the CGIA. | EPSO: Compensatory damages are tort-like legal relief and thus barred by the CGIA. | Held: Compensatory damages for age claims are limited by §24-34-405(3)(g) to remedies in subsection (2); compensatory damages are barred by the CGIA. |
| Is front pay for an age-discrimination claim barred by the CGIA? | Williams: Front pay is an equitable remedy under CADA and not barred. | EPSO: Front pay sounds in tort/legal relief and is barred. | Held: Front pay is equitable under §24-34-405(2) and not barred by the CGIA. |
| Are compensatory damages for a retaliation claim under CADA barred by the CGIA? | Williams: CADA’s purpose and 2013 amendments make compensatory damages incidental equitable remedies, exempt from CGIA under §24-34-405(8)(g). | EPSO: Compensatory damages are legal/tort remedies and thus barred by CGIA (per Houchin majority). | Held: Compensatory damages for retaliation are equitable/incidental to CADA’s purpose and not barred by the CGIA; claim may proceed. |
| Does the word “state” in §24-34-405(8)(g) include political subdivisions like EPSO? | Williams: “State” should be read broadly to include all employers able to claim CGIA immunity (state and political subdivisions). | EPSO: “State” should be read narrowly (state of Colorado only), excluding political subdivisions. | Held: “State” includes state employers and political subdivisions able to assert CGIA immunity; §24-34-405(8)(g) removes CGIA protection for CADA compensatory damages (except age-limited claims). |
Key Cases Cited
- City of Colorado Springs v. Conners, 993 P.2d 1167 (Colo. 2000) (CADA remedies are equitable and not primarily compensatory; relief incidental to statutory purpose)
- Brooke v. Rest. Servs., Inc., 906 P.2d 66 (Colo. 1995) (statutory remedies serving remedial purposes are incidental to broader anti-discrimination objectives)
- Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n ex rel. Ramos v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 759 P.2d 726 (Colo. 1988) (CADA’s remedial purpose to redress discriminatory employment practices)
- Colo. Dep’t of Transp. v. Brown Grp. Retail, Inc., 182 P.3d 687 (Colo. 2008) (CGIA coverage depends on the source and nature of government liability)
- Robinson v. Colo. State Lottery Div., 179 P.3d 998 (Colo. 2008) (nature of relief is not dispositive; court must examine duty breached to determine if claim lies in tort)
- Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Equalization v. Gerganoff, 241 P.3d 932 (Colo. 2010) (statutory interpretation should give harmonious effect to all parts of a statute)
- Developmental Pathways v. Ritter, 178 P.3d 524 (Colo. 2008) (court should avoid unnecessary constitutional rulings; principles of judicial restraint)