v. Burgandine, 2020 COA 142

Defendant James Burgandine and the victim, his ex-girlfriend, share a child; after their breakup the child lived with the victim.
After the victim denied Burgandine access to the child one afternoon, Burgandine spent seven hours calling and texting her with numerous insults and threats (including threats against police).
He was charged with harassment, credible-threat stalking, and emotional-distress stalking; a jury convicted him of harassment and credible-threat stalking and acquitted on the emotional-distress count.
The prosecution charged stalking under § 18-3-602(1)(a) (which lists ‘‘makes a credible threat … and, in connection with the threat, repeatedly follows, approaches, contacts, or places under surveillance’’) and argued the calls/texts were ‘‘contacts.’'
Burgandine appealed only the stalking conviction, arguing ‘‘contacts’’ in subsection (1)(a) cannot reasonably include ordinary communications (phone/text) because subsection (1)(b) separately covers ‘‘any form of communication.’'
The Court of Appeals held that ‘‘contacts’’ includes communications such as phone calls and texts and affirmed the stalking conviction as supported by sufficient evidence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether "contacts" in § 18-3-602(1)(a) includes phone calls and text messages	Calls/texts are "contacts" under (1)(a); plain meaning of "contact" includes communicating	"Contacts" must be read narrowly to avoid redundancy with (1)(b); requires physical proximity and thus excludes calls/texts	Court: "Contacts" has its plain meaning, which includes communications; rejects narrowing to a proximity requirement; conviction affirmed

Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (noscitur a sociis canon referenced)
Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (surplusage rule and limits on avoiding plain meaning)
King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (preference for ordinary statutory meaning over forced readings)
Barton v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 904 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2018) (endorsing choice of plain meaning over strained constructions)
Town of Rib Mountain v. Marathon Cty., 926 N.W.2d 731 (Wis. 2019) (textualist preference for plain statutory meaning)