Usaa Texas Lloyds Company v. Gail Menchaca
545 S.W.3d 479
| Tex. | 2018Background
- Gail Menchaca sued USAA Texas Lloyds for Hurricane Ike damages, alleging breach of the homeowners policy and violations of the Texas Insurance Code; the jury answered three pertinent questions: Q1 (breach of policy) = NO, Q2 (various statutory violations) = YES only for failure to conduct a reasonable investigation, and Q3 (damages measured as unpaid policy benefits) = $11,350.00.
- Trial court concluded Q1 was defective and disregarded it, then entered judgment for Menchaca based on Q2 and Q3; USAA challenged that ruling.
- Menchaca sought only policy benefits as damages for the statutory violation (she abandoned independent extra-contractual damages).
- The central factual support for Q1=NO included evidence that Menchaca’s loss was less than her policy deductible, so the insurer had no contractual obligation to pay benefits.
- The opinion addresses whether an insured may recover policy benefits as damages for an insurer’s statutory violation when a jury rejects contractual liability but finds a statutory violation and awards policy-benefit-style damages.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a statutory-violation finding permits recovery of unpaid policy benefits when the jury rejected breach of contract | Menchaca argued the statutory violation (failure to investigate) caused loss of policy benefits and the jury awarded benefits-style damages (Q3) | USAA argued plaintiff failed to prove entitlement to policy benefits (Q1=NO), so statutory violation alone cannot create a right to policy benefits | The dissent would hold Menchaca cannot recover policy benefits because she failed to prove contractual entitlement; statutory violation alone does not establish right to policy benefits (no-recovery rule) |
| Whether a jury answer awarding ‘‘policy-benefit’’ damages can be reconciled with a separate answer finding no breach | Menchaca treated Q3 as damages flowing from Q2; she urged the court to give effect to both answers | USAA argued Q3 is legally fallacious given Q1=NO (no unpaid benefits existed) and thus judgment cannot rest on Q3 | The dissent concludes the answers are logically incompatible and that, because plaintiff failed her burden on contract liability, defendant is entitled to judgment; trial court erred in disregarding Q1 |
| Whether the trial court’s failure to direct the jury to reconsider conflicting answers waives appellate review | Menchaca (and some justices) emphasized preservation rules and timing for objections; trial court rejected further jury deliberations | USAA maintained post-verdict motions preserved the conflict issue and Rule 295 does not bar appellate review when the court elects not to reform the verdict | The dissent reasons Rule 295 permits but does not mandate reformation and that appellate courts may review judgment entered on potentially conflicting answers when preservation is satisfied (e.g., post-verdict motions) |
| Burden of proof and remedy when plaintiff fails to obtain findings supporting recovery | Menchaca relied on jury damages answer to support recovery | USAA stressed plaintiff bore the burden to secure findings on every element and she failed to prove entitlement to benefits | The dissent would render judgment for USAA because plaintiff failed to obtain necessary findings and cannot recover absent contract entitlement or independent statutory damages |
Key Cases Cited
- Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1989) (jury’s negative answer on an ultimate issue means plaintiff failed to carry burden of proof)
- Provident Am. Ins. Co. v. Castañeda, 988 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1998) (statutory violation alone does not entitle insured to policy benefits; independent injury required)
- Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Davis, 904 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. 1995) (some bad-faith acts may give rise to damages distinct from contractual breach)
- City of Brownsville v. Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. 1995) (a jury’s “no” on liability can render related questions immaterial)
- Little Rock Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Dunn, 222 S.W.2d 985 (Tex. 1949) (appellate consideration of potentially conflicting answers even when parties declined to object at trial)
- Fleet v. Fleet, 711 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1986) (incomplete verdicts require timely objection to prompt redeliberation)
- United Scaffolding, Inc. v. Levine, 537 S.W.3d 463 (Tex. 2017) (plaintiff bears burden to secure findings supporting recovery)
- St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Duke, 424 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. 1967) (motion for new trial can preserve objection to judgment based on conflicting findings)
- C. & R. Transp., Inc. v. Campbell, 406 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. 1966) (court considered conflicting findings when parties sought outright victory)
- St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Murphree, 357 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. 1962) (statement that entry of judgment on conflicting findings is not per se fundamental error; discussion of preservation mechanisms)
