US Dominion, Inc. v. Powell, Civil Action No. 2021-0040

Background

Dominion Voting Systems sued Sidney Powell (and related entities), Rudolph Giuliani, and Michael Lindell/MyPillow for defamatory statements after the 2020 election, alleging broad false claims that Dominion "flipped," "weighted," or "injected" votes and that it was tied to foreign actors.
Defendants made televised appearances, rallies, published materials (including Lindell’s "ABSOLUTE PROOF"), and repeated claims after Dominion sent retraction demands; Dominion alleges reputational harm, threats to employees, and over $651 million in damages.
Defendants moved to dismiss on various grounds: statements were nonactionable opinion or litigation advocacy; Dominion failed to plead actual malice; lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue; statutory claims insufficiency; and, as to Giuliani, that corporate plaintiffs must specially plead lost profits under Rule 9(g) and individualized damages for Article III purposes.
The court evaluated the complaints under Rule 12(b)(6) (and jurisdictional challenges under the D.C. long-arm statute and due process), accepting Dominion’s well-pleaded allegations as true for purposes of the motions.
The court found many of the challenged statements to be capable of proof or to imply provably false facts, concluded Dominion adequately alleged actual malice for Powell and Lindell, found deceptive-trade-practices claims sufficiently pleaded, and determined that D.C. courts had specific jurisdiction and venue was proper.
The court denied all motions to dismiss in full and left factual disputes (credibility, falsity, damages) for later stages of litigation.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether challenged statements are actionable facts or nonactionable opinion	Dominion: many public assertions (e.g., video of Dominion founder saying he can change a million votes; machines "flip" votes) are verifiable and therefore factual	Powell/Lindell: statements were rhetorical hyperbole, opinion, or litigation advocacy and not provably false facts	Court: Many statements alleged could be proved true/false or imply provably false facts; therefore actionable as pleaded
Whether Dominion pleaded actual malice (knowledge or reckless disregard)	Dominion: alleged fabricated/doctored evidence, unreliable/ghostwritten affidavits, cherry‑picked experts, continuing post-retraction repetition = actual malice	Defendants: relied on sworn affidavits, expert reports, and no subjective doubts; allegations insufficient	Court: Dominion alleged sufficient circumstantial facts to plausibly show defendants knew the falsity or acted with reckless disregard (Powell, Lindell); case survives pleading stage
Deceptive trade practices claims under state statutes	Dominion: defendants had financial motive (donation solicitations, product promotion) and made false statements in trade/promotion contexts	Defendants: claims recast defamation; Powell not engaged in trade/commerce; Minnesota statute only allows injunctive relief	Court: Claims adequately pleaded (financial motive, promotional conduct alleged); statutes permit relief in addition to common law remedies
Personal jurisdiction (D.C. long-arm & due process)	Dominion: defendants purposefully availed themselves of D.C. through in-person appearances, televised interviews, rallies, and solicitations causing reputational injury here	Defendants: lack of contacts, out-of-D.C. conduct cannot establish specific jurisdiction	Court: Specific jurisdiction and long-arm reach satisfied by in-District business activity, in-person statements, and alleged injuries in D.C.
Venue and transfer (convenience to move to TX or MN)	Dominion: D.C. forum has substantial connection (in-person appearances, press conference, rallies, related suits)	Defendants: preferred home forums (Northern District of Texas, District of Minnesota) are more appropriate	Court: Venue proper in D.C.; defendants failed to show transfer warranted under §1404(a) by preponderance
Giuliani: Rule 9(g) pleading of special damages and Article III standing/amount-in-controversy	Dominion: corporate plaintiffs alleged economic harms, mitigation costs, and lost-contract projections totaling >$651M; damages pleaded with sufficient specificity	Giuliani: corporations limited to economic loss and must plead lost profits with heightened specificity and individualized amounts for jurisdiction	Court: Article III and amount-in-controversy satisfied; Rule 9(g) pleading pleaded lost profits/pecuniary harms with adequate particularity; dismissal denied

Key Cases Cited

Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) (statements implying provably false facts can be defamatory)
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (actual malice standard for public‑figure defamation)
St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968) (reckless disregard = high degree of awareness of probable falsity)
Harte‑Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989) (evidence of motive alone insufficient; reckless conduct standard requires more)
Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (subjective‑doubt standard for actual malice)
Lohrenz v. Donnelly, 350 F.3d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (sources and probabilities relevant to malice inquiry)
GTE New Media Servs. Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (D.C. long‑arm/constitutional jurisdiction discussion)
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014) (general jurisdiction principles)
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011) (general and specific jurisdiction distinction)
St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938) (amount‑in‑controversy principle governs diversity jurisdiction)
Kaspersky Lab, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 909 F.3d 446 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (discussion of corporate plaintiffs’ reputational interests and damages)
Messina v. Krakower, 439 F.3d 755 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (attorney out‑of‑court statements not automatically privileged)