Uriel Gonzalez v. Stuart Sherman, 873 F.3d 763

Gonzalez was convicted in California (2001) of multiple attempted murder counts and sentenced to 65 years to life; the trial court initially awarded 533 days of presentence credits.
After exhausting direct review and filing a federal habeas petition (denied as time-barred), Gonzalez sought correction under Cal. Penal Code § 1237.1; the Superior Court increased his credits to 554 days and an amended abstract of judgment was filed (April 2013).
Gonzalez then filed a new federal habeas petition challenging conviction and sentence; the district court dismissed it as an unauthorized "second or successive" petition under AEDPA § 2244(b).
The district court agreed with the magistrate judge that the Superior Court’s credit amendment was merely a computational or "nunc pro tunc" fix and did not create a new, intervening judgment.
The Ninth Circuit granted COA and reversed, holding that under California law an amendment correcting presentence custody credits alters the sentence (the judgment) and thus constitutes a new, intervening judgment for AEDPA purposes.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a state court’s recalculation of presentence custody credits creates a new, "intervening" judgment under AEDPA	Gonzalez: correcting credits produces an amended, valid judgment and thus the first federal petition after amendment is not "second or successive."	State: the amendment was a mere computational/clerical (nunc pro tunc) correction that did not change the final judgment; petition remains successive.	The Ninth Circuit held the credit recalculation changed the sentence and produced a new judgment; the subsequent federal petition was not "second or successive."
Whether labeling the amendment as "retroactive" or treating it as nunc pro tunc defeats the conclusion that a new judgment exists	Gonzalez: substance matters; correcting an unauthorized sentence is a rendering change that produces a new judgment regardless of retroactive effect.	State/district court: because the court awarded credits "as of the original sentencing date," the change was effectively nunc pro tunc and did not alter finality.	The court held that a recalculation of credits is a "rendering" correction, not a mere scrivener’s/nunc pro tunc fix; retroactive effect (dating from sentencing) is typical and does not negate that a new judgment was entered.

Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010) (an amended or new judgment intervening between petitions means a later §2254 application is not "second or successive")
Wentzell v. Neven, 674 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2012) (an amended judgment by state court creates an intervening judgment so later federal petition is not successive, even when unchanged components are challenged)
Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147 (2007) ("the sentence is the judgment" in criminal cases)
Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211 (1937) (treating sentence as the judgment)
In re Stansell, 828 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2016) (state-court technical or ministerial amendments that change custody-controlling terms can constitute new judgments)
People v. Karaman, 842 P.2d 100 (Cal. 1992) (a sentence that fails to award legally mandated custody credit is unauthorized and may be corrected)