15 Cal. App. 5th 1182
Cal. Ct. App. 5th2017Background
- Allyne Urick executed a charitable remainder annuity trust in 2013 and fully restated it in August 2014; distribution scheme gave annuity income to Willis (son), Dana (daughter), and grandson Urick‑Stasa, with remainder to Phillips Academy. A January 2014 handwritten note indicated Allyne intended to disinherit Willis, but later signed a full restatement reinstating him.
- Dana (daughter) became successor trustee and after Allyne died filed a petition to reform the trust alleging misrepresentation/mistake by the drafter (Boykin) to reflect what she claimed was Allyne’s intent (to disinherit Willis and change distributions).
- Willis (son) filed a petition for instructions alleging Dana’s reformation petition violated the trust’s no‑contest clause and lacked probable cause; he sought a determination whether Dana’s pleading was a direct contest under Probate Code §21310 and §21311.
- Dana, as trustee, moved to strike Willis’s petition under the anti‑SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc. §425.16), arguing the reformation petition was protected petitioning activity and she filed it in her capacity as trustee and with probable cause.
- The probate court granted Dana’s anti‑SLAPP motion and awarded fees; on appeal the Court of Appeal reversed, holding (1) anti‑SLAPP applies to petitions to reform trusts (it is protected activity), but (2) Willis made a prima facie showing of probability of success because Dana filed as a beneficiary (or in dual capacity), the petition alleged fraud (a direct contest ground), and she lacked probable cause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Willis) | Defendant's Argument (Dana) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the anti‑SLAPP statute apply to a probate petition enforcing a no‑contest clause? | Anti‑SLAPP should not apply to enforcement of no‑contest clauses because it undermines Probate Code policy and increases litigation. | Filing a reformation petition is protected petitioning activity (judicial proceeding) so anti‑SLAPP applies. | Anti‑SLAPP applies: the petition arises from protected judicial activity; any exemption must come from the Legislature. |
| Did Willis show Dana filed the reformation petition as a beneficiary (i.e., a contest) rather than solely as trustee? | Yes; the petition’s form, verification, captions, and substance show Dana acted as beneficiary pursuing personal gain. | No; Dana filed as trustee and had statutory standing under Probate Code §17200 to petition. | Willis made a prima facie showing Dana filed as beneficiary or in dual capacity; the evidence defeats Dana’s motion at this stage. |
| Was the reformation petition a "direct contest" under Probate Code §21310 (e.g., alleging fraud, undue influence)? | Yes; petition alleges misrepresentation and nondisclosure by drafter (fraud), seeking to invalidate distributive provisions. | No; the petition sought reformation for mistake/misrepresentation, not an effort to invalidate the trust as a direct contest. | The substance controls over labels: allegations of misrepresentation/nondisclosure suffice to plead contest grounds (fraud) making it a direct contest. |
| Did Dana have probable cause to file the reformation petition under §21311(b)? | No; objective facts known (videotaped execution, restated trust signed by Allyne, no signed amendments removing Willis) made reformation unlikely — no reasonable likelihood of success. | Yes; further discovery could show that Allyne’s intent differed and justify reformation. | Willis met the minimal showing: given the restated trust and execution evidence, a reasonable person would not have probable cause to expect the requested relief. |
Key Cases Cited
- Baral v. Schnitt, 1 Cal.5th 376 (describing the two‑step anti‑SLAPP framework)
- Taus v. Loftus, 40 Cal.4th 683 (second‑step anti‑SLAPP inquiry is summary‑judgment‑like; plaintiff’s evidence accepted for prima facie showing)
- Donkin v. Donkin, 58 Cal.4th 412 (modern treatment and public‑policy balancing for no‑contest clauses)
- Cassel v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.4th 113 (courts apply plain statutory text even where policy concerns exist)
- Greco v. Greco, 2 Cal.App.5th 810 (anti‑SLAPP applied in probate context; scope of protected activity and limits)
- Anderson v. Geist, 236 Cal.App.4th 79 (courts construe anti‑SLAPP broadly to protect petition and speech rights)
- Lazar v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.4th 631 (elements of common‑law fraud)