Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion, KP-0147

Texas Tax Code § 11.13 implements the constitutional residence homestead exemption and defines a "residence homestead."
Subsection 11.13(l)(2)(B) preserves homestead status when an owner "temporarily stops occupying" the residence because of "residency in a facility that provides services related to health, infirmity, or aging," provided no different principal residence is established.
The Brazos County Attorney asked the Attorney General to clarify what kinds of residences qualify as a "facility that provides services related to health, infirmity, or aging," noting modern variations such as independent-living and continuing-care communities.
The statute does not define "facility," "services," "health," "infirmity," or "aging;" thus the office looked to ordinary meanings and statutory construction principles.
The Attorney General concluded that a court would likely read the provision to cover establishments set up to assist persons with illness, injury, physical/mental weakness, or aging through a range of activities — regardless of whether the resident actually receives those services.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a "facility that provides services related to health, infirmity, or aging" includes modern independent-living or continuing-care residences	Assisted-living and skilled-care facilities clearly qualify; independent-living may not because residents do not require ADL assistance or health services	Statute should be read by ordinary meanings; the term covers establishments set up to provide assistance related to health, infirmity, or aging and does not require actual receipt of services	A court would likely construe the phrase to cover establishments set up to assist persons with illness, injury, infirmity, or aging through a range of activities, regardless of whether the owner receives services

BCCA Appeal Grp., Inc. v. City of Houston, 496 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2016) (primary objective in statutory construction is to effectuate legislative intent)
Tex. Student Hous. Auth. v. Brazos Cty. Appraisal Dist., 460 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. 2015) (give undefined statutory terms their ordinary meaning)
R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Gulf Energy Expl. Corp., 482 S.W.3d 559 (Tex. 2016) (use ordinary meaning absent a different definition in context)
TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432 (Tex. 2011) (same rule on ordinary meaning)
Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. v. White, 490 S.W.3d 468 (Tex. 2016) (determine legislative intent from the statute as a whole)
Kirby Lake Dev., Ltd. v. Clear Lake City Water Auth., 320 S.W.3d 829 (Tex. 2010) (the term "services" has broad scope)
Sw. Bell Tel., L.P. v. Emmett, 459 S.W.3d 578 (Tex. 2015) (courts should accept the Legislature’s word choice when construing statutes)