Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion, KP-0138

A former Maud, Texas mayor pleaded guilty in Arkansas in 1994 and received a five-year probated suspended sentence under Arkansas Act 346 (First Offender Act), conditioned on good behavior and fees.
The defendant was discharged early after satisfactorily fulfilling probation; Arkansas court entered an Order Terminating Probation and stated the movant was "exonerated" and "released from all penalties and disabilities" resulting from the proceeding.
Texas Election Code § 141.001(a)(4) disqualifies from holding Texas public office a person "finally convicted of a felony from which the person has not been pardoned or otherwise released from the resulting disabilities."
Question presented: whether the Arkansas deferred disposition and subsequent judicial release/preclusion of disabilities prevents Texas from treating the person as disqualified from holding office, and whether omission of the Arkansas matter on a Texas ballot application could violate § 141.031.
Records submitted show no Arkansas adjudication of guilt under Act 346; Arkansas precedent (Duncan) treats Act 346 deferments as not convictions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Arkansas First Offender deferred disposition constitutes a "final conviction" barring Texas officeholding under Tex. Elec. Code § 141.001(a)(4)	The Arkansas proceeding was a felony conviction that should trigger Texas disqualification	The Arkansas order deferred adjudication and later discharged/released the defendant from penalties and disabilities, so no disqualifying final conviction exists	The Arkansas proceeding did not result in a Texas-disqualifying conviction; the discharge/release removes the disabilities that § 141.001(a)(4) targets
Whether Texas must recognize the Arkansas court's order removing penalties and disabilities	Texas may disregard out-of-state orders for qualifications	Full Faith and Credit requires Texas to recognize valid sister-state judgments removing penalties and disabilities	Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause Texas must recognize the Arkansas order releasing penalties and disabilities, so § 141.001(a)(4) does not bar officeholding
Whether failing to disclose the Arkansas matter on a Texas ballot application violated Tex. Elec. Code § 141.031	Omission rendered the application false and may be a crime or basis to challenge candidacy	Because the Arkansas order removed disabilities, the matter did not constitute an undisclosed disqualifying conviction	Unlikely a court would find a violation of § 141.031 given the Arkansas release; factual/criminal questions are for courts, not the AG opinion

State v. Webb, 281 S.W.3d 273 (Ark. 2008) (describing Arkansas Act 346 First Offender scheme)
Duncan v. State, 823 S.W.2d 886 (Ark. 1992) (recognizing an Act 346 deferment is not a conviction)
Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222 (1998) (full faith and credit requires recognition of a final judgment from a court with adjudicatory authority)
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940) (presumption of jurisdiction for judgments of courts of general jurisdiction)
Bard v. Charles R. Myers Ins. Agency, Inc., 839 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. 1992) (Full Faith and Credit Clause requires recognition of sister-state acts, records, and proceedings)
In re Christus Santa Rosa Health Sys., 492 S.W.3d 276 (Tex. 2016) (statutory construction begins with plain language)