Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion
GA-0833
| Tex. Att'y Gen. | Jul 2, 2011Background
- Capital Metro was created in 1985 and includes the City as an original participant.
- The City withdrew from Capital Metro effective January 19, 1988 under former section 451.603.
- After withdrawal, the Legislature enacted sections 451.610 and 451.616, directing funding of disability services by withdrawn units via sales/use tax refunds and reimbursements.
- The Comptroller withholds from the withdrawn unit's sales/use tax refunds the amount equal to the difference between service costs and fares, remitting to the service provider.
- Senate inquiry asks whether sections 451.610 and 451.616 apply retroactively to the City without violating the Texas Constitution.
- The Attorney General concludes these sections are not retroactive and Capital Metro may charge the City for disability-related services.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Are sections 451.610 and 451.616 retroactive? | City argues these laws impair vested rights and are retroactive. | State contends statutes impose new duties prospectively; no retroactive effect. | Not retroactive under Tex. Const. art. I, § 16; fees permitted. |
| Do withdrawn cities retain any rights to resist funding obligations? | City asserts vested rights in continued exemption from funding. | State may revise laws; municipalities have no vested rights against the State. | Withdrawn cities have no vested rights preventing funding obligations. |
| May Capital Metro charge the City for disability services after withdrawal? | City questions legality of charges under new statutes. | Statutes authorize funding and reimbursement mechanisms for services. | Capital Metro may charge the City for services provided under the Transportation Code. |
Key Cases Cited
- Suharu of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212 (Tex. 2002) (retroactivity requires more than upset of expectations; no vested rights principle for municipalities)
- Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109 (Tex. 1998) (statutory changes may affect vested rights absent destruction of enforcement)
- Tooke v. Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325 (Tex. 2006) (municipalities are creations of the legislature; no inherent privileges against state law)
- Deacon v. City of Euless, 405 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. 1966) (municipalities lack vested immunities against state authority)
- Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (U.S. 1994) (interpretation of retroactivity in federal context; effects on vested rights)