Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion
GA-1046
| Tex. Att'y Gen. | Jul 2, 2014Background
- The Texas Legislature enacted H.B. 2302 (effective Sept. 1, 2013), which added Government Code § 51.851 to impose new electronic-filing fees (including a $20 fee) payable on certain civil filings and appeals.
- H.B. 2302 includes an uncodified section 21 expressly exempting the § 51.851 fees from Gov’t Code § 51.607 and stating it applies to fees payable on or after Sept. 1, 2013.
- Gov’t Code § 51.607(c) generally delays the effect of new or changed court fees until the next January 1 after the law takes effect.
- Earlier in the same legislative session, S.B. 390 repealed former § 51.607(d), which had allowed express statutory exceptions to § 51.607; S.B. 390 became effective June 14, 2013.
- The question presented: do district court clerks begin collecting the new § 51.851 fees on Sept. 1, 2013 (H.B. 2302’s effective date) or must collection be delayed until Jan. 1, 2014 pursuant to § 51.607(c) as amended by S.B. 390?
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether new electronic-filing fees under § 51.851 take effect Sept. 1, 2013 or are delayed until Jan. 1, 2014 under § 51.607(c). | H.B. 2302’s repeal of the exception and S.B. 390’s repeal of § 51.607(d) show the Legislature intended all new fees to begin Jan. 1 without exception. | H.B. 2302’s uncodified § 21 expressly exempts § 51.851 from § 51.607 and applies to fees payable on or after Sept. 1, 2013, so the fees are effective Sept. 1, 2013. | The Attorney General held the new fees apply to fees payable on or after Sept. 1, 2013; H.B. 2302’s express exemption controls and there is no irreconcilable conflict with S.B. 390. |
Key Cases Cited
- R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future & Clean Water, 336 S.W.3d 619 (Tex. 2011) (courts give effect to legislative intent as expressed in plain statutory language)
- Wright v. Broeter, 196 S.W.2d 82 (Tex. 1946) (when statutes from same session conflict, there must be an express repeal or irreconcilable repugnancy for the later act to control)
- FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868 (Tex. 2000) (Legislature is presumed to know how to express its intent; silence does not imply a change in meaning)
- Tex. Lottery Comm'n v. First State Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d 628 (Tex. 2010) (courts avoid interpreting statutes as rendering other provisions meaningless)
- Jefferson Cnty. v. Bd. of Cnty. & Dist. Rd. Indebtedness, 182 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. 1944) (one Legislature cannot bind a subsequent Legislature)