Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion, KP-0009

Request from Robertson County District Attorney about meaning of "disability" on the Texas early voting-by-mail application under Tex. Elec. Code § 82.002.
Section 82.002(a) permits mail-in voting when a voter has a "sickness or physical condition that prevents the voter from appearing at the polling place on election day without a likelihood of needing personal assistance or of injuring the voter's health."
The Secretary of State advised that § 82.002 provides the appropriate standard: a voter should believe they have a condition preventing appearance without assistance or injury.
Question presented: whether the application box labeled "Disability" refers only to § 82.002’s sickness/physical-condition standard or also to other statutory/federal definitions (e.g., SSA or VA standards).
Attorney General concluded the plain text controls: no requirement to satisfy another agency’s disability definition to qualify; a separate disability finding (SSA/VA) alone does not automatically determine eligibility under § 82.002.
Proof of disability need not be submitted with the application but may be required if the voter's mail-in qualification is judicially challenged.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether "disability" on the mail‑in ballot application incorporates other statutory or agency definitions of disability	Applicant (requestor) asks whether "disability" means only § 82.002’s sickness/physical condition or also definitions from other statutes/agencies	SOS: § 82.002 sets the applicable standard; a voter need only believe they meet the § 82.002 condition (prevented from appearing without assistance or injury)	Held: Eligibility is governed by § 82.002’s standard. Other agencies’ disability determinations, standing alone, are not determinative of eligibility under § 82.002; judicial challenge may require proof.

Tiller v. Martinez, 974 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 1998) (procedural statutory requirements for absentee ballots are mandatory)
Zanchi v. Lane, 408 S.W.3d 373 (Tex. 2013) (statutory construction focuses on plain language as evidence of legislative intent)
TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Comm’n on State Emergency Commc’ns, 397 S.W.3d 173 (Tex. 2013) (deference to agency interpretations only when statute ambiguous and the interpretation is reasonable)