University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar
133 S. Ct. 2517
| SCOTUS | 2013Background
- UTSW Medical Center affiliated with Parkland Hospital; affiliation requires Parkland to offer vacant staff posts to University faculty.
- Respondent is a physician of Middle Eastern descent who worked as both University faculty and Hospital staff physician; alleged harassment by Levine based on religion and ethnicity.
- Respondent resigned teaching post in 2006 after letters and harassment; Parkland offered Hospital post, which was withdrawn after Fitz protested.
- Respondent alleged two Title VII claims: status-based discrimination under §2000e–2(a) and retaliation under §2000e–3(a).
- District Court and Fifth Circuit proceedings upheld retaliation claim but vacated constructive-discharge; issues focused on causation standard for retaliation.
- Supreme Court held that Title VII retaliation claims require but-for causation, not the motivating-factor standard.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| What causation standard applies to Title VII retaliation claims? | Nassar argues but-for causation should apply to retaliation. | University argues motivating-factor standard controls, not but-for. | But-for causation governs retaliation claims. |
| Does §2000e–2(m) apply to retaliation claims as to but-for vs motivating-factor? | §2000e–2(m) applies to retaliation claims as a motivating factor standard. | §2000e–2(m) excludes retaliation; cannot extend to §2000e–3(a). | §2000e–2(m) does not apply to retaliation claims; but-for standard governs under §2000e–3(a). |
| Is reliance on EEOC guidance appropriate to interpret §2000e–2(m) for retaliation claims? | EEOC guidance supports applying motivating-factor; deference under Skidmore warranted. | EEOC guidance lacks persuasive force to override textual/structural limits. | EEOC guidance not controlling; text/structure override guidance. |
| Should Price Waterhouse framework apply to retaliation claims after 1991 amendments? | Price Waterhouse burden-shifting applies to all discrimination including retaliation. | 1991 amendments replaced Price Waterhouse framework for Title VII claims. | Price Waterhouse framework does not apply to retaliation claims. |
| Is retaliation conceptually linked to status-based discrimination to justify its inclusion in §2000e–2(m)? | Retaliation is closely tied to discrimination; broad interpretation appropriate. | Title VII is a detailed scheme; retaliation should be treated separately under §2000e–3. | Retaliation not encompassed by §2000e–2(m); but-for standard applies. |
Key Cases Cited
- Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (mixed-motive framework for status-based discrimination; but-for not required)
- Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (but-for causation required in age discrimination context; informs Title VII interpretation)
- CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (2008) (retaliation can be treated as discrimination under broader statutes)
- Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 544 U.S. 167 (2005) (retaliation in context of discrimination is a form of discrimination)
- Gómez-Pérez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474 (2008) (federal-sector ADEA retaliation interpreted within the statute's structure)
- Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (analyze congressional amendments and statutory structure; relevance to Title VII)
- Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156 (1981) (structural considerations in statutory interpretation of employment provisions)
- Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (retaliation linked to discrimination as prohibited conduct)