University of Miami v. Francois
2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 20459
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2011Background
- Francois's wife Caroline Francois died after initial negligence by Nurse Martinez during childbirth; UM was vicariously liable for Kerns' actions but not a joint tortfeasor with Nurse Martinez.
- Francois settled with Nurse Martinez and Medical Staffing in January 2010, executing a Release and Settlement Agreement releasing them from all claims.
- The Release did not expressly reserve Francois's right to pursue a claim against the University of Miami (the subsequent tortfeasor).
- Francois argued that two post‑execution documents—the December 2009 mediation memorandum and an Addendum (and Second Addendum)—reserved his claims against UM.
- UM moved for summary judgment; the trial court granted it, holding the release barred Francois's claim against UM; rehearing later vacated, allowing consideration of Addenda as evidence of intent.
- On appeal, the court held the Addenda were parol evidence created after the agreement and could not alter clear terms of the Release; the release did not reserve against UM, so UM was entitled to summary judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did the Release expressly reserve Francois's claim against UM? | Francois argues Addenda show reservation of UM claim. | UM contends the Release's terms were clear and unambiguous, not reserving UM. | Release did not expressly reserve UM; UM entitled to summary judgment. |
| May post‑execution Addenda be used as parol evidence to supply an intent not stated in the Release? | Addenda are integral to the Release and reflect the parties' intent. | Addenda are parol evidence and cannot modify the unambiguous four corners of the Release. | Addenda were parol evidence and could not be used to alter the Release. |
| Did the trial court err in considering Addenda on rehearing to discern intent? | Error not to consider Addenda as binding parts of the agreement. | Parol evidence rule precludes considering Addenda to interpret the Release. | Trial court erred; should have adhered to four corners of the Release. |
Key Cases Cited
- Underwriters at Lloyds v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 382 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 1980) (initial tortfeasor bears the total burden where subsequent health care providers contribute)
- Mosley v. Amer. Med. Int'l, Inc., 712 So.2d 1149 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (double liability prevented; subrogation when appropriate)
- Rucks v. Pushman, 541 So.2d 673 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (clear reservation required to avoid subrogation; when not clear, initial tortfeasor bears liability)
- Wickenheiser v. Ramm Vending Promotion, Inc., 560 So.2d 350 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (parol evidence rule applicability to interpret contracts)
- Sheen v. Lyon, 485 So.2d 422 (Fla.1986) (intent determined from four corners of a written instrument)
- Garcia v. Tarmac Am., Inc., 880 So.2d 807 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (parol evidence limits in contract interpretation)
- V&M Erectors, Inc. v. The Middlesex Corp., 867 So.2d 1252 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (parol evidence and contract interpretation principles in Florida)