United States v. Zukerman, 451 F.Supp.3d 329

Defendant Morris E. Zukerman pleaded guilty in 2016 to tax evasion and obstruction and was sentenced in 2017 to 70 months’ imprisonment followed by one year of supervised release; he began serving at FCI Otisville in June 2017 and has paid his fine and restitution in full.
Zukerman is 75 years old and has diabetes, hypertension, and obesity. His physician placed him in the highest-risk category for severe COVID-19 complications.
Conditions at Otisville (dormitory-style housing, shared bathrooms and dining, no individual cells) and confirmed COVID-19 cases in the facility make social distancing and isolation impracticable.
On March 27, 2020 Zukerman requested compassionate release from the warden and, after receiving no response, moved the district court under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) for transfer to supervised release with home confinement.
The Government opposed, arguing Zukerman had not satisfied § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement and that his serious, lengthy offense made him an inappropriate release candidate.
The court waived the administrative-exhaustion requirement as futile/unduly prejudicial given the pandemic, found extraordinary and compelling reasons based on age, co-morbidities, and prison conditions, and modified Zukerman’s remaining term to home incarceration immediately (to be followed by the previously imposed supervised release).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 3582(c)(1)(A) exhaustion requirement bars the motion	Zukerman argued exhaustion should be excused because delay would risk severe illness/death from COVID-19	Government argued statutory exhaustion must be enforced (or 30-day lapse) before court acts	Court waived exhaustion due to futility/undue prejudice and exigent pandemic risk
Whether "extraordinary and compelling reasons" exist to reduce sentence	Zukerman argued age and serious medical conditions plus Otisville conditions create extraordinary and compelling reasons	Government argued seriousness and duration of offense weigh against release	Court found extraordinary and compelling reasons: age, comorbidities, and high infection risk at Otisville justify modification
Appropriate scope of relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A) and § 3553(a) considerations	Zukerman sought immediate transfer to supervised release with home confinement for remainder of sentence	Government emphasized seriousness of offense and original sentence purpose	Court modified sentence: remaining imprisonment replaced by equal period of home incarceration (no electronic monitoring), immediate release, followed by original supervised release; conditions set by Probation

Theodoropoulos v. I.N.S., 358 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2004) (discusses strict enforcement of exhaustion but recognizes exceptions)
Washington v. Barr, 925 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2019) (statutory exhaustion not absolute; outlines exceptions)
McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140 (U.S. 1992) (administrative exhaustion principles)
Pavano v. Shalala, 95 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 1996) (policies favoring exhaustion and flexibility in waiver)
Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467 (U.S. 1986) (irreparable medical injury can justify waiver of exhaustion)
Abbey v. Sullivan, 978 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1992) (delay in exhaustion may be waived where health would deteriorate)
New York v. Sullivan, 906 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1990) (waiver appropriate when exhaustion would cause irreparable injury)
Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850 (U.S. 2016) (limits on courts creating exceptions to statutory exhaustion)
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (U.S. 1976) (administrative deference may be inappropriate where prompt resolution is required)