United States v. Zemlyansky
1:12-cr-00171
S.D.N.Y.Jan 11, 2016Background
- Mikhail Zemlyansky was convicted after a jury trial (March 19, 2015) of participating in a racketeering conspiracy and of securities, mail, and wire fraud tied to investment schemes (Lyons Ward and Rockford Group) and related conspiracies.
- Government evidence included cold-caller testimony, witness identifications, a voice recording alleged to be Zemlyansky ("Bob Hamilton" call), bank records showing funds routed overseas, and testimony from co-conspirators and a money launderer.
- Prior EDNY investigation into Rockford Group and a related Grayson Hewitt scheme produced extensive materials and led to prosecutions of Rapaport, Liounis, and Yagodayev; Zemlyansky contends those EDNY materials (65,000+ pages) were withheld.
- Zemlyansky moved under Rule 33 for a new trial alleging (1) Rule 16 discovery violations and (2) Brady due-process violations based on nondisclosure of EDNY investigation materials.
- The district court analyzed Rule 33/newly discovered evidence standards and Brady/constitutional materiality (reasonable probability/collective-impact standards) and evaluated whether nondisclosure undermined confidence in the verdict.
- Court denied the motion: it found the EDNY materials largely cumulative of trial evidence, not sufficiently likely to produce an acquittal, and not so material under Brady as to undermine confidence in the verdict.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether nondisclosure of EDNY investigation materials violated Rule 16 and warrants Rule 33 relief (new trial) | Zemlyansky: EDNY materials would show paucity of documentary proof and differing investigative findings/techniques, altering quantum of proof and justifying a new trial | Government: either disclosed relevant materials or materials were cumulative/irrelevant (many concern Grayson Hewitt), so nondisclosure would not meet Rule 33 standards | Denied — even if materials were subject to Rule 16, they were largely cumulative/impeaching and would not likely produce acquittal; no Rule 33 relief granted |
| Whether nondisclosure of EDNY materials violated Brady (Due Process) | Zemlyansky: suppressed EDNY evidence (including statements identifying a different "main guy") was favorable, impeaching, and could have changed the trial outcome or fairness | Government: materials mainly relate to a different scheme; Rockford Group evidence in EDNY files is consistent with trial evidence; suppression did not undermine confidence in verdict | Denied — court found no reasonable probability that nondisclosure undermined confidence in the verdict; trial remained fair |
| Whether particular post-arrest statements (e.g., Liounis identifying "Alex" as main actor) would have been admissible or outcome-changing | Zemlyansky: such statements would have impeached Government theory and connected others as primary actors, weakening case against him | Government: such statements likely inadmissible hearsay or unavailable (witness outside U.S. or Fifth Amendment issues); even if admissible, they would not overcome corroborating evidence | Denied — court held statements unlikely to change outcome given corroborating voice IDs, witness testimony, and other evidence; admissibility issues also limit impact |
| Standard for evaluating suppressed evidence collectively | Zemlyansky: aggregated EDNY materials create a different picture of culpability and investigative focus | Government: collective review shows consistency with trial proof and does not produce reasonable probability of different result | Court applied collective/ Kyles standard and concluded suppressed evidence does not undermine verdict confidence |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must disclose favorable material evidence to defendant)
- Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) (Brady duty covers impeachment evidence and applies even without request)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (materiality assessed by reasonable probability standard and collective impact)
- Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (reasonable probability standard for impeachment evidence)
- United States v. Bell, 584 F.3d 478 (2d Cir. 2009) (Rule 33 requires real concern that innocent person convicted)
- United States v. Forbes, 790 F.3d 403 (2d Cir. 2015) (newly discovered evidence relief requires evidence not merely cumulative/impeaching and likely to result in acquittal)
- United States v. Owen, 500 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2007) (standards for newly discovered evidence under Rule 33)
- United States v. McCourty, 562 F.3d 458 (2d Cir. 2009) (Rule 33 motions are granted only in extraordinary circumstances)
- United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing scope of materiality in Brady context)
- United States v. Gil, 297 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2002) (prejudice required to establish Brady violation; discusses admissibility limits on hearsay as Brady material)
- United States v. Sanchez, 969 F.2d 1409 (2d Cir. 1992) (Rule 33 relief standard: manifest injustice to let guilty verdict stand)
