United States v. Zam Mung, 989 F.3d 639

Law enforcement ran an online sting posing as a truck driver offering sex with his 15‑year‑old stepdaughter; an ad described an 18‑year‑old but officers twice told Mung she was 15.
Mung responded, exchanged calls/texts, agreed to pay $150, and was arrested at the arranged motel.
Grand jury indicted Mung for attempted commercial sex trafficking of a child (18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (b)(2), and § 1594(a)) and attempted online enticement of a minor (18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)).
Jury convicted Mung on the § 1591 count and acquitted on § 2422(b); district court sentenced him to 120 months and imposed a $5,000 special assessment under 18 U.S.C. § 3014.
On appeal Mung raised three principal challenges: (1) the indictment and jury instructions allowed a reckless‑disregard mens rea for the victim’s age, (2) the jury instruction’s use of the phrase “sex trafficking” was improper/prejudicial, and (3) the $5,000 special assessment was improper because he was indigent and there was no actual victim.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Mung)	Defendant's Argument (Government)	Held
Whether § 1591 permits conviction on proof of reckless disregard as to victim’s age	Reckless‑disregard mens rea applies only to force/fraud/coercion clause; age requires actual knowledge	Statute’s text and structure show "knowing, or . . . reckless disregard" covers age as well	Affirmed: reckless‑disregard may satisfy mens rea as to age
Whether calling the offense "sex trafficking" in jury instruction was improper/prejudicial	The statutory heading shouldn’t substitute for operative text; label is pejorative and misleading	Using the statutory title as a descriptor did not alter elements or mislead jury	Affirmed: no abuse of discretion; error, if any, was harmless
Whether § 3014 $5,000 assessment may be imposed given Mung’s alleged indigency	He was indigent and/or there was no real victim (sting) so assessment improper	Defendant had funds at sentencing; statute applies to convictions and to attempts; assessment funds are general victims’ fund	Affirmed: district court did not clearly err on indigency and assessment is authorized for attempts

Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351 (2014) (court must give effect to every clause/word of a statute)
Florida Dept. of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33 (2008) (statutory headings cannot substitute for operative text but may aid interpretation)
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002) (statutory titles and headings can be interpretive tools)
United States v. Chappell, 665 F.3d 1012 (8th Cir. 2012) (recognizing § 1591 covers knowing or reckless disregard of victim’s age)
United States v. Whyte, 928 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding reckless disregard may satisfy § 1591 age mens rea)
United States v. Banker, 876 F.3d 530 (4th Cir. 2017) (same conclusion on reckless‑disregard for age)
United States v. Garcia‑Gonzalez, 714 F.3d 306 (5th Cir. 2013) (interpreting § 1591 mens rea to include reckless disregard as to age)
United States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22 (2d Cir. 2012) (same premise on mens rea for age)
United States v. Kelley, 861 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 2017) (indigency burden and consideration of current/future ability to pay under § 3014 reviewed for clear error)
United States v. Cacioppo, 460 F.3d 1012 (8th Cir. 2006) (statutory‑text first step in interpretation)