United States v. Young, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 4632

Young engaged in forged-check-cashing from December 2003 to September 2005; state court sentenced him on twenty counts, with one term initially 30–60 months later reduced to 273 days to 24 months, and he was released on parole February 13, 2006.
Despite supervision, Young again engaged in counterfeit-check activity; July 8, 2006 attempt at JC Penney drew federal attention; April 17, 2007 he was indicted for conspiracy to make, utter, and possess counterfeit securities; he pled guilty October 16, 2007.
Plea agreement kept the offense level at eight with a criminal history category VI, yielding an advisory guideline range of 18–24 months.
February 22, 2008, the district court sentenced Young to 24 months’ imprisonment, restitution of $384.74, and 3 years of supervised release.
Beginning supervised release in September 2008, Young tested positive for cocaine on October 10, 2008; November 6, 2008 he was arrested for forgery, escape, resisting arrest, false reports, and false identification; a state sentence followed, after which federal revocation proceedings occurred on January 29, 2010.
The district court found a Grade B supervised-release violation, set a 21–27 month advisory range, but capped at 24 months due to statutory maximum; it imposed 24 months’ imprisonment plus 12 months’ supervised release, explicitly citing 3553(a) factors.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether §3553(a)(2)(A) factors may be considered in revocation sentences	Young contends §3583(e) precludes §3553(a)(2)(A) analysis.	Young argues the listed factors are not within §3583(e)’s mandatory considerations.	No reversible error; §3553(a)(2)(A) may inform revocation decisions.
Whether the court erred by stating the defendant preyed on others	District court relied on unsupported evidence from a co-defendant hearing and improper finding about prey on victims.	History from the PSR supportedpreying-on-vulnerable addicts; court could rely on that history.	Finding supported by the PSR and prior proceedings; no error.
Whether restitution sourcing was properly considered	Court faulted Young for restitution paid by his mother, not by Young.	Explains restitution funding reflects on responsibility and breach of trust.	Court properly weighed the restitution issue as part of sanctioning conduct.
Whether the court gave meaningful consideration to mitigation	Defendant contends mitigation factors were not adequately weighed.	Court acknowledged substance-abuse issues and potential community support, but found lesser weight warranted.	The record demonstrates meaningful consideration; the sentence was reasonable in light of mitigation.

United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 2007) (revocation sanctions sanction breach of trust; consideration of §3553(a) factors permissible)
United States v. Williams, 443 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 2006) (§3583(e) does not foreclose considering other pertinent factors)
United States v. Lewis, 498 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2007) (§3553(a)(2)(A) factors are essentially redundant but may be considered)
United States v. Miqbel, 444 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2006) (limitations on relying on §3553(a)(2)(A) in revocation; not a per se ban)
United States v. Simtob, 485 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2007) (severity of underlying offense may inform recidivism risk; not ignored)
United States v. Doe, 617 F.3d 766 (3d Cir. 2010) (procedural reasonableness requires meaningful consideration of §3553(a) factors)
United States v. Blackston, 940 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1991) (recognizes breach of trust and deterrence considerations in revocation)
United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433 (4th Cir. 2006) (notes on how §3553(a)(2)(A) factors interact with revocation sentencing)