639 F.Supp.3d 515
W.D. Pa.2022Background
- Defendant Darren Young was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for possessing eight rounds of 9mm ammunition on Nov. 9, 2021; he has four prior Pennsylvania felony drug convictions.
- After Bruen issued (New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen), Defendant moved to dismiss § 922(g)(1) as facially unconstitutional and as-applied to him, arguing Bruen confirms an individual right to carry that defeats the felon‑possession ban.
- The Government opposed, arguing Bruen did not disturb Heller/McDonald dicta that felon‑dispossession statutes are presumptively lawful and that historical tradition supports § 922(g)(1).
- The court reviewed Supreme Court precedent (Heller, McDonald, Bruen), Third Circuit rulings (Marzzarella, Barton, Binderup, Holloway, Folajtar, Boyd), and post‑Bruen district decisions.
- The court held Bruen altered the analytical framework but did not undermine the longstanding view that felons may be excluded from § 922 protections; it denied the motion to dismiss both facially and as‑applied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Young) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Facial validity of § 922(g)(1) under Bruen | § 922(g)(1) is consistent with the Second Amendment because felon dispossession is a longstanding regulatory tradition | Bruen requires historical‑tradition proof and shows individual right to carry; § 922(g)(1) is therefore unconstitutional | Denied: Bruen did not displace Heller/McDonald dicta that felon bans are presumptively lawful; historical tradition supports § 922(g)(1) |
| Whether Bruen’s textual/historical test upends prior two‑step approach | Bruen preserves Heller’s statement that felon bans are longstanding; government need only show consistency with historical tradition if the plain text applies | Bruen’s rejection of means‑end scrutiny requires reexamination and favors dismissal | Held: Bruen changes the test but its dicta and concurrences leave intact the legitimacy of longstanding felon dispossession statutes |
| As‑applied challenge by a felon with non‑violent drug convictions | Even if government bears the historical burden post‑Bruen, Young’s drug‑trafficking felonies place him outside the Second Amendment’s protection | Young argues he is a “person” protected and that historical tradition does not support blanket bans as applied to him | Denied: Court finds Young’s felony history fits within historically barred classes; he failed to show facts distinguishing him from those historically disarmed |
| Ammunition vs firearm possession distinction | Government and precedent treat ammunition possession by felons as covered by the same tradition and regulation as firearms | Young argues distinction is immaterial but attempts to use it to narrow the scope of § 922(g)(1) | Denied: Court treats ammunition possession as governed by the same historical regulatory tradition as firearms possession |
Key Cases Cited
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (recognizes individual right to possess arms at home but states dicta that felon dispossession is permissible)
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (incorporates Second Amendment against the states and reiterates Heller’s statement on felon bans)
- New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022) (adopts a text‑and‑history test for gun regulations and rejects means‑end scrutiny)
- United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010) (applies a two‑step framework to Second Amendment challenges and considers whether challenged conduct falls within the Amendment)
- United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2011) (presumes felon dispossession statutes regulate unprotected conduct and details as‑applied analysis)
- Binderup v. Attorney General, 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (allows as‑applied challenges and identifies factors to show a conviction is not a historically disqualifying serious offense)
- Holloway v. Attorney General, 948 F.3d 164 (3d Cir. 2020) (applies Binderup factors and finds certain convictions exclude Second Amendment protection)
- Folajtar v. Attorney General, 980 F.3d 897 (3d Cir. 2020) (holds certain federal felony convictions place a defendant outside Second Amendment protection)
- United States v. Boyd, 999 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 2021) (applies historical analysis and burden‑shifting in as‑applied challenges involving domestic‑violence restrictions)
- United States v. Bena, 664 F.3d 1180 (8th Cir. 2011) (discusses historical regulation of firearms and ammunition in relation to felon bans)
- United States v. Jimenez, 895 F.3d 228 (2d Cir. 2018) (upholds § 922(g)‑style prohibitions as applied to certain categories, including ammunition)
- Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2019) (discusses historical regulation and scope of disarmament for dangerous persons)
