United States v. Yonas Eshetu
898 F.3d 36
D.C. Cir.2018Background
- Defendants Lovo and Sorto were convicted by a jury of Hobbs Act conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 1951) and using/possessing a firearm during a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)).
- On direct appeal the D.C. Circuit largely affirmed but remanded limited ineffective-assistance claims; it rejected a vagueness challenge to § 924(c)(3)(B) (the residual clause).
- After that decision, the Supreme Court held § 16(b)’s residual clause unconstitutionally vague in Sessions v. Dimaya.
- § 16(b) and § 924(c)(3)(B) contain materially identical residual-clause language defining “crime of violence.”
- Petitioners (with amicus support) sought panel rehearing arguing Dimaya requires vacatur of their § 924(c) convictions; the government conceded rehearing but urged a case-specific (conduct-based) construction to avoid vagueness.
- The panel concluded Dimaya controls, held § 924(c)(3)(B) void for vagueness, and vacated the § 924(c) convictions while leaving other aspects of the earlier decision intact.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague | Lovo/Sorto: Dimaya invalidates materially identical residual clauses, so § 924(c)(3)(B) is void for vagueness | Government: § 924(c)(3)(B) should be interpreted case-specific (defendant’s conduct) to avoid vagueness | § 924(c)(3)(B) is void for vagueness under Dimaya; vacatur of § 924(c) convictions granted |
| Whether this panel may adopt a conduct-based approach despite circuit precedent | Lovo/Sorto: Dimaya controls; categorical approach leads to vagueness | Government: Dimaya permits a case-specific construction; panel should reject Kennedy’s categorical rule | Panel bound by Kennedy’s categorical approach; cannot adopt new construction absent en banc/full-court action |
| Whether Dimaya undermines Kennedy (categorical rule for § 924(c)) | Lovo/Sorto: Dimaya mandates invalidation and does not salvage Kennedy | Government: Dimaya casts doubt on Kennedy, allowing a different interpretation | Dimaya does not overrule Kennedy; Dimaya’s plurality actually favored categorical reading, so Kennedy remains governing circuit precedent |
| Remedy for vacating § 924(c) convictions | Lovo/Sorto: Vacatur of § 924(c) convictions | Government: Requested rehearing and alternative construction instead of vacatur | Court vacated the § 924(c) convictions and remanded for further proceedings consistent with Dimaya and prior unaffected holdings |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Eshetu, 863 F.3d 946 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (prior panel decision affirming most convictions and rejecting vagueness challenge to § 924(c)(3)(B))
- Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (Supreme Court holding § 16(b) residual clause unconstitutionally vague)
- United States v. Salas, 889 F.3d 681 (10th Cir. 2018) (invalidating § 924(c)(3)(B) based on textual parity with § 16(b))
- United States v. Kennedy, 133 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (requiring a categorical approach to § 924(c)(3)(B))
- LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (panel cannot overrule prior panel precedent; only full court/en banc can)
- United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (discussing when panel may depart from circuit precedent in light of intervening Supreme Court authority)
- Irons v. Diamond, 670 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting informal practices for full-court review)