United States v. Yielding, 657 F.3d 722

Yielding was convicted of aiding and abetting a violation of the federal Anti-Kickback Statute and falsification of a document, with restitution totaling $944,995.84.
The government sought and obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) to prevent spending or dispersal of a $160,000 settlement payment earned by Yielding to settle unrelated civil litigation.
The settlement arose from a March 2010 consent judgment and Asset Purchase Agreement placing $160,000 to Yielding and entities he controlled; the check was payable to Yielding and his attorneys, Perroni & Koehler.
Yielding claimed the assets conveyed belonged to VHI and VBL, and that the settlement proceeds were encumbered by creditors, so none should be applied to restitution.
The district court ordered that $80,000 of the proceeds be applied to restitution, half of the $160,000, after considering liens and ownership claims.
On appeal, the court vacated the restitution order and the corresponding $80,000 payment directive, but retained the TRO and remanded for further restitution proceedings, noting due process concerns and potential ownership issues.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the TRO was validly issued in the criminal context	Yielding and third-parties contend lack of jurisdiction under Rule 65/All Writs Act.	Government argues district court had authority to enforce restitution and issue TRO to preserve assets.	The TRO was valid; sentencing court has jurisdiction to enforce restitution and may use All Writs Act relief.
Whether the settlement proceeds could be applied to restitution without adjudicating ownership	Proceeds are available to Yielding to satisfy restitution as owner of the funds.	Ownership is contested; third parties may have superior claims requiring notice and adjudication.	Ownership must be resolved; due process requires adjudication of competing claims before applying funds to restitution.
Effect of vacating the restitution order on the related payment directive	Payment directive should stand as part of enforcement of restitution.	With the restitution order vacated, the payment directive should be reversed or reconsidered.	Payment order is vacated; remand for potential reinstatement if restitution is reimposed.

United States v. Resnick, 594 F.3d 562 (7th Cir.2010) (restitution enforcement and related authority)
United States v. Mays, 430 F.3d 963 (9th Cir.2005) (restitution enforcement authority and remedies)
Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697 (2d Cir.2000) (restitution enforcement principles)
Timilty, 148 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.1998) (restitution enforcement mechanisms)
United States v. Scarboro, 352 F. Supp. 2d 714 (E.D.Va.2005) (restitution collection considerations)
United States v. Abdelhadi, 327 F. Supp. 2d 587 (E.D.Va.2004) (All Writs Act relief to prevent asset concealment)
United Indus. Corp. v. Clorox Co., 140 F.3d 1175 (8th Cir.1998) (standard for injunctive relief under All Writs Act)