United States v. Yepa, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 12723

Gavin Yepa was arrested in connection with the December 28–29, 2011 homicide of Lynette Becenti and convicted of first-degree felony murder and aggravated sexual abuse in Indian country.
After requesting an attorney at arrest, Yepa was taken to the Jemez Pueblo PD where FBI Agent Bourgeois obtained a telephonic warrant to search Yepa’s person (photos, clothing, blood, and DNA swabs).
A roughly 50‑minute audio‑recorded search of Yepa’s person was conducted by Bourgeois, Chief Toya, and two ERT members; portions of Yepa’s remarks were in Towa (untranslated).
During the search Yepa spontaneously made several incriminating remarks (denying he was a killer, acknowledging blood and abrasions, describing circumstances of the victim being at his house), interspersed with officers’ routine directions and a few clarifying questions (e.g., “With who?” “Who were you with?”).
Yepa moved to suppress the recorded statements, arguing they were the product of custodial interrogation after he requested counsel; the district court denied suppression, finding the statements spontaneous and any officer follow‑ups were neutral clarifications.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding the officers’ words and conduct were either routine and non‑interrogative or neutral clarifications, and Yepa’s challenged statements were spontaneous/unresponsive.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether statements made during a warranted search of Yepa’s person after he requested counsel were the product of custodial interrogation (and thus must be suppressed)	Government: statements admissible because officers’ words/actions were routine to executing the warrant and any questions were neutral clarifications, not interrogation	Yepa: officers’ comments and follow‑ups (and his vulnerable state) were reasonably likely to elicit incriminating responses; thus statements were the product of interrogation after he asked for counsel	Court: affirmed denial of suppression — most officer conduct was non‑interrogative; challenged questions were neutral/follow‑up and many of Yepa’s incriminating remarks were unresponsive and therefore spontaneous and admissible

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966) (custodial interrogation requires Miranda warnings; voluntary statements admissible)
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (U.S. 1980) (defines interrogation as express questioning or words/actions reasonably likely to elicit incriminating response)
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (U.S. 1981) (after requesting counsel, interrogation must cease until counsel present)
United States v. Cash, 733 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2013) (objective test for whether police words/actions were reasonably likely to elicit incriminating response)
Fox v. Ward, 200 F.3d 1286 (10th Cir. 2000) (custody alone does not make every exchange an interrogation)
United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1985) (unresponsive incriminating statements admissible)
Parson v. United States, 387 F.2d 944 (10th Cir. 1968) (voluntary unresponsive statements not barred by Miranda)
United States v. Rommy, 506 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2007) (whether interrogation occurred is a legal determination reviewed de novo)
United States v. Davis, 773 F.3d 334 (1st Cir. 2014) (legal determination of interrogation reversible on de novo review)
United States v. Sherwood, 98 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 1996) (whether a statement was the product of interrogation is a factual finding reviewed for clear error)