United States v. Worthy, 699 F.3d 661

Worthy was detained August 6, 2010 on conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute.
The last indictment (October 26, 2011) charged Worthy with four counts related to cocaine distribution and a separate telephone-use count; Worthy pled not guilty to the fourth superseding indictment on November 1, 2011.
In 2012 Worthy moved for dismissal and for release under the Speedy Trial Act; the government stipulated that 147 non-excludable days elapsed on the 70-day trial clock.
The district court dismissed the indictment without prejudice; Worthy was discharged August 2, 2012 and immediately re-arrested the same day for a new complaint mirroring the prior offenses; Aug 7, 2012 he was re-indicted on four counts.
The new indictment reset the 70-day clock under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(d)(1); Worthy argued that the 90-day § 3164 detention clock was not restarted by the re-indictment.
The district court followed Tirasso, holding that § 3164's 90-day clock does not restart on re-indictment; the First Circuit disagreed and held that the 90-day clock restarts when re-arrested on a new complaint.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does re-indictment restart the §3164 90-day clock?	United States contends the 90-day period restarts after re-arrest on a new indictment.	Worthy contends the 90-day clock does not restart upon re-indictment for the same offense.	Yes; the 90-day clock restarts when re-arrested on a new indictment.

United States v. Tirasso, 532 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1976) (90-day clock not restarted on reindictment)
United States v. Hastings, 847 F.2d 920 (1st Cir. 1988) (Speedy Trial Act clock coverage and purpose)
United States v. Corley, 548 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (exclusions apply to §3164 detention clock)