United States v. Wilmer Canelas-Amador, 837 F.3d 668

Background

Defendant Wilmer Canelas-Amador pled guilty in Tennessee state court to aggravated assault; the trial court approved a form order accepting his plea but never entered a criminal judgment or imposed sentence.
Before sentencing, federal immigration authorities took Canelas-Amador into custody and deported him; the state court later issued a capias when he missed a presentence interview.
Canelas-Amador illegally reentered the U.S., pleaded guilty in federal court to illegal reentry, and received a 57-month sentence based largely on a 16-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) for a prior conviction that was a crime of violence.
The district court treated the state court’s plea-acceptance order as a “formal judgment of guilt” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (the INA definition) and thus as a qualifying conviction for the guideline enhancement.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit held the plea-acceptance form order did not constitute a “formal judgment of guilt” because no adjudication, adjudication-withheld order, or sentence was entered; therefore § 1101(a)(48)(A)’s narrower definition governs and the enhancement was improper.

Issues

Issue	Canelas-Amador's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether the Tennessee plea-acceptance order is a “conviction” under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii)	The INA definition (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A)) applies; no formal judgment/sentence was entered, so no conviction	The guidelines definition (U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(4)) or broader precedent treats a guilty plea alone as a conviction for sentencing	The court applies the INA definition under rule of lenity and holds there was no formal judgment of guilt, so no enhancement
Whether Pritchett controls to treat a guilty plea as a conviction despite incomplete state proceedings	Pritchett does not control this situation because statutory INA definition governs and requires a formal judgment	Government argues Pritchett and guideline definitions support treating the plea as a conviction	Court rejects reliance on Pritchett here and distinguishes it; Pritchett does not resolve this case
Whether the district court’s criminal-history points and "under a criminal justice sentence" finding were proper	Points improper because no sentence was imposed and the capias does not equal being under a criminal sentence	Government maintained the Presentence Report was correct	Court finds those determinations incorrect and ties to absence of state sentencing
Whether rule of lenity applies to resolve definitional ambiguity between statute and guideline	Argues ambiguity favors defendant; guidelines affect liberty so lenity applies	Government argues guidelines’ internal definition controls or Pritchett resolves ambiguity	Court applies rule of lenity and interprets ambiguity in defendant’s favor

Key Cases Cited

Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37 (statutory interpretation presumption about ordinary meaning of words)
Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211 ("Final judgment in a criminal case means sentence")
Mejia Rodriguez v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 629 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir.) (uses Rule 32(k) definition of formal judgment of guilt)
Puello v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 511 F.3d 324 (2d Cir.) (adopts Rule 32(k) approach)
Perez v. Elwood, 294 F.3d 552 (3d Cir.) (interprets formal judgment requirement under INA)
United States v. Pritchett, 749 F.3d 417 (6th Cir.) (prior guilty plea can in some circumstances constitute conviction)
United States v. Medina, 718 F.3d 364 (4th Cir.) (applies INA definition for § 2L1.2)
United States v. Mendez-Sosa, 782 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir.) (applies guidelines’ definition for conviction)
United States v. Boucha, 236 F.3d 768 (6th Cir.) (permits applying rule of lenity to Sentencing Guidelines)