United States v. Willis
826 F.3d 1265
| 10th Cir. | 2016Background
- Defendant Ivan Bennett Willis was tried in federal court for aggravated sexual abuse in Indian country after admitting sexual intercourse with 17-year-old K.M. but asserting she consented; the jury convicted him.
- The sole disputed issue at trial was whether Willis used force to overcome K.M.’s lack of consent.
- Government gave pretrial notice under Fed. R. Evid. 413 and the district court admitted testimony from two women (A.M. and A.N.) about prior sexual assaults by Willis as propensity evidence.
- Willis moved to exclude his juvenile records (used to locate the prior-acts witnesses), to suppress custodial statements to agents, and to admit evidence of K.M.’s sexual behavior (Rule 412); the district court denied those motions.
- Willis appealed, challenging admission of Rule 413 evidence, the means of obtaining juvenile records, the voluntariness of his statements, exclusion of K.M.’s sexual-history evidence, alleged vouching by an agent, and cumulative error. The Tenth Circuit affirmed in all respects.
Issues
| Issue | United States' Argument | Willis' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of prior sexual-assault evidence (Rule 413) | Prior acts were sexual assaults and highly probative on propensity to use force; admissible despite juvenile status | Prior incidents did not amount to sexual assault or were unduly prejudicial under Rule 403; juvenile status weighs against admission | Affirmed: district court did not abuse discretion — threshold Rule 413 requirements met and Rule 403 balance favored admission |
| Use of juvenile records to locate witnesses | Records lawfully obtained from Tribal Court and were cumulative to Willis’s own disclosures; no prejudice | Release violated due process/expungement rules and privacy interests from Choctaw Youth Code | Affirmed: no federal due-process right to bar disclosure absent prejudice; Willis showed no prejudice and had already disclosed incidents to agents |
| Suppression of custodial statements (invocation of counsel) | Agents ceased questioning after Willis requested counsel; Willis later reinitiated and knowingly waived; statements were voluntary | Invocation of right to counsel under Edwards barred further interrogation; later statements therefore inadmissible | Affirmed: waiver was knowing and voluntary because Willis initiated further discussion and agents re-Mirandized him |
| Admission of K.M.’s sexual-history evidence (Rule 412) | Evidence of semen from boyfriend not necessary because Willis admitted intercourse; not relevant to consent | Evidence would show alternative source of physical evidence and motive to lie | Affirmed exclusion: evidence irrelevant to consent issue and defense could elicit motive to lie through other testimony |
| Improper vouching by investigating agent | Testimony about victim disclosure patterns and agent saying he believed K.M. did not affect outcome; objection not specific | Agent improperly vouched for victim, affecting fairness | Affirmed: plain-error review — any vouching was harmless because consent (not occurrence) was dispute and Willis did not show reasonable probability of different outcome |
| Cumulative error | N/A | Combined errors deprived Willis of fair trial | Affirmed: no multiple prejudicial errors to cumulate; conviction stands |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427 (10th Cir.) (Rule 413 admission presumption in sexual-assault cases)
- United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326 (10th Cir.) (three threshold requirements for Rule 413 and relevance analysis)
- United States v. Contreras, 536 F.3d 1167 (10th Cir.) (abuse-of-discretion standard for evidentiary rulings)
- United States v. Sturm, 673 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir.) (standards for reviewing discretionary evidentiary rulings)
- United States v. Parra, 2 F.3d 1058 (10th Cir.) (limits on appellate review when trial evidence differs from suppression hearing)
- United States v. Bass, 661 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir.) (renewal of suppression motion and when trial evidence may be considered)
- United States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488 (10th Cir.) (no absolute time limit on admissibility of prior sex offenses)
- Nilson v. Layton City, 45 F.3d 369 (10th Cir.) (no federal constitutional right to expungement preventing disclosure)
- United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (U.S. Supreme Court) (failure to follow internal regs does not establish due process violation without prejudice)
- Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (U.S. Supreme Court) (post-invocation interrogation barred unless accused initiates further communication)
- Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (U.S. Supreme Court) (waiver of counsel after invocation requires initiation by accused)
- United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371 (10th Cir.) (defendant-initiated remarks can support waiver after request for counsel)
- United States v. Begay, 937 F.2d 515 (10th Cir.) (Rule 412/other-evidence context where prior sexual acts relevant to source of physical evidence)
- United States v. Nez, 661 F.2d 1203 (10th Cir.) (when defendant admits intercourse, other-person sexual-history evidence generally irrelevant to consent)
- United States v. Hinson, 585 F.3d 1328 (10th Cir.) (harmlessness standard for claims that error affected substantial rights)