United States v. Willie Benton, Jr., 957 F.3d 696

Background

DEA surveilled Benton; during a meeting at his Akron home a courier (Merida) delivered ~4 kg powder cocaine; Merida was stopped and 4 kg powder found in his car.
Search of Benton’s home recovered the 4 kg powder, ~3 kg crack cocaine in a locked safe in an upstairs bedroom, and a handgun nearby.
Benton pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute cocaine (Count 1); Count 2 was dismissed by agreement.
The PSR treated the 3 kg crack as "relevant conduct" under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2), producing total offense level 33, criminal-history category VI, and a Guidelines range of 235–293 months.
At sentencing the government presented wiretap and witness testimony that Benton trafficked both powder and crack, that the crack amount was inconsistent with personal use, and that Benton stored the crack in a safe next to a firearm; Benton argued the crack was unsellable "junk." The district court found the crack was part of Benton’s course of conduct and denied a downward departure for criminal-history overrepresentation.
The court imposed a 260-month sentence; Benton appealed arguing (1) the 3 kg crack should not have been counted as relevant conduct and (2) the sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the 3 kg of crack in the safe was "relevant conduct" under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2)	Benton: Crack was unsellable "junk" so he lacked intent to distribute; thus it is not part of same scheme/course of conduct	Government/District Court: Evidence (wiretap, quantities, storage, firearm, admissions) shows intent to distribute; offenses are part of same course/common scheme	Affirmed: district court’s factual finding of intent not clearly erroneous; crack counted as relevant conduct under both common-scheme and same-course prongs
Whether the district court procedurally erred by overemphasizing Guidelines or criminal history	Benton: Court relied too heavily on Guidelines/CHC VI; treated Guidelines as mandatory; criminal history overrepresented because many points from misdemeanors	Government: Court considered § 3553(a) factors, discussed differences with co-defendant, and properly weighed recidivism and public-safety concerns	Affirmed: sentencing was procedurally reasonable; court applied § 3553(a), used advisory Guidelines, relied on non-erroneous facts
Whether the 260-month sentence was substantively unreasonable (including disparity with co-defendant Merida)	Benton: Sentence excessive and disparate from Merida’s 84 months	Government/District Court: Differences in criminal history and roles justified much higher sentence for Benton	Affirmed: within-Guidelines sentence was not an abuse of discretion given Benton’s lengthy criminal history and conduct

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Gill, 348 F.3d 147 (6th Cir. 2003) (relevant conduct may include uncharged drug types/quantities)
United States v. Phillips, 516 F.3d 479 (6th Cir. 2008) (describes two alternative bases for relevant-conduct: common scheme or same course of conduct)
United States v. Buchanan, 933 F.3d 501 (6th Cir. 2019) (elements of possession with intent to distribute require intent to distribute)
United States v. Price, 134 F.3d 340 (6th Cir. 1998) (conviction requires subjective intent to distribute)
United States v. Henry, 819 F.3d 856 (6th Cir. 2016) (clear-error review of sentencing factual findings)
United States v. Shannon, 803 F.3d 778 (6th Cir. 2015) (preponderance standard applies to sentencing factfinding)
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (district courts must calculate Guidelines, consider § 3553(a), and explain sentence)
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (Guidelines are advisory post-Booker)
United States v. Faulkner, 926 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2019) (deference to within-Guidelines sentences)
United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2018) (procedural-reasonableness principles for sentencing)