United States v. Williams
934 F.3d 1122
| 10th Cir. | 2019Background
- Cameo Williams, Sr., an Army veteran who never served overseas, received VA benefits for combat-related PTSD based on his statements claiming overseas combat service.
- VA review revealed inconsistent accounts and military records showing no overseas deployment; at an informal VA hearing Williams testified he served in Iraq May–Sept 2007 and submitted a buddy statement.
- The VA Review Officer investigated post-hearing, contacted the JSRRC, and found records contradicting Williams (he was treated at Madigan Army Medical Center during the alleged period); the VA proposed to sever the service connection for PTSD.
- A federal grand jury indicted Williams under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) for falsely stating at the VA hearing that he served in Iraq; a jury convicted him and the district court sentenced him to five years’ probation.
- On appeal Williams raised three challenges: insufficiency/plain-error on materiality under § 1001; exclusion of two defense expert witnesses (Fifth and Sixth Amendment claim); and admission of his prior statements to VA examiners (Rule 404(b) dispute).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Materiality of false VA hearing testimony under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) | Williams: VA reg. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(2) limits VA to military records, so his lay testimony about Iraq could not be material. | Government: Materiality is objective — whether the false statement was capable of influencing the VA decisionmaker; Williams sought to invoke combat-lay-testimony rule, so the claim was capable of influencing the benefits determination. | Affirmed: The false statement was objectively material because it could have influenced the VA’s determination of entitlement to combat-related PTSD benefits. |
| Exclusion of two defense expert witnesses (right to present a defense) | Williams: Excluding Rada (VA practice testimony) and Dr. Wescott (PTSD diagnosis) violated Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights and would have negated materiality. | Government: Proposed testimony was irrelevant to the legal element of materiality here and risked juror confusion. | Affirmed: Exclusion was not an abuse of discretion; testimony irrelevant to whether the false statement was capable of influencing the VA decision. |
| Admission of Williams’s prior statements to VA examiners (intrinsic vs. Rule 404(b)) | Williams: Prior statements were extrinsic propensity evidence barred by Rule 404(b). | Government: Prior statements were intrinsic — they explained the award of benefits, the VA investigation, and the charged false statement’s context. | Affirmed: District court properly admitted the prior statements as intrinsic evidence; Rule 404(b) inapplicable. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Johnson, 821 F.3d 1194 (10th Cir. 2016) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
- United States v. Hutchinson, 573 F.3d 1011 (10th Cir. 2009) (sufficiency review principles)
- United States v. Williams, 865 F.3d 1302 (10th Cir. 2017) (objective materiality standard under § 1001)
- United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (U.S. 1995) (materiality is a jury question; mixed law and fact)
- United States v. Christy, 916 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 2019) (framework for asking what statement, what decision, and whether it could influence decision)
- United States v. Harrod, 981 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1992) (elements of a § 1001(a)(2) offense)
- United States v. Porter, 745 F.3d 1035 (10th Cir. 2014) (do not reweigh credibility on sufficiency review)
- United States v. Camick, 796 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2015) (contrast where agency decisionmaking could not be influenced)
- United States v. McBane, 433 F.3d 344 (3d Cir. 2005) (materiality despite agency investigation being essentially complete)
- United States v. Thomas, 849 F.3d 906 (10th Cir. 2017) (intrinsic evidence can explain investigative course)
- Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (U.S. 1967) (constitutional right to compulsory process for witnesses)