United States v. Williams
893 F.3d 696
10th Cir.2018Background
- Trayon L. Williams pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
- Presentence report initially did not treat Williams’s prior Kansas aggravated-battery conviction as a “crime of violence,” producing a lower guidelines range.
- The government objected; the district court sustained the objection and enhanced Williams’s base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), raising the guideline range (the court later departed to 40 months).
- Williams appealed the enhancement, arguing his Kansas aggravated-battery conviction (Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5413(b)(1)(B)) is not a categorical “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1).
- Central legal questions: whether Kansas aggravated battery requires a mens rea sufficient for a Guideline “crime of violence,” and whether its element of “causing bodily harm” necessarily involves the use of physical force.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Kansas aggravated battery qualifies as a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) | Government: yes; statute requires knowing causation of bodily harm and thus involves physical force | Williams: no; statute can be satisfied recklessly/unintentionally and "causing bodily harm" need not entail force | Held: Yes. The conviction is a crime of violence. |
| Whether a mens rea of “knowing” suffices for the Guideline enhancement | Government: “knowing” is sufficient because it denotes awareness that harm is reasonably certain | Williams: “knowing” equates to recklessness or allows non‑intentional conduct, so it is insufficient | Held: “Knowing” (general criminal intent) suffices; defendant’s argument forfeited in part and fails on merit. |
| Whether Kansas’s “knowing” is indistinguishable from recklessness | — | Williams: Kansas’s “reasonable certainty” standard equals recklessness | Held: Forfeited on appeal (not raised below); court declines to reach the merits. |
| Whether “causing bodily harm” necessarily involves the use of physical force | Government: yes—intentional/knowing causation of injury requires force | Williams: no—statute focuses on result, not use of force | Held: Intentional/knowing causation of bodily harm necessarily involves physical force (relying on Castleman); Treto‑Martinez and Ontiveros support the result. |
Key Cases Cited
- Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530 (2013) (sentencing begins with Guidelines calculation)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (compare statutory elements to categorical definition)
- United States v. Zuniga‑Soto, 527 F.3d 1110 (10th Cir. 2008) (reckless‑conduct statutes do not qualify as crimes of violence)
- United States v. Armijo, 651 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 2011) (Guidelines’ crime‑of‑violence requires purposeful/intentional behavior)
- United States v. Treto‑Martinez, 421 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 2005) (prior Kansas aggravated‑battery statute qualified as a crime of violence)
- United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (knowing or intentional causation of bodily injury necessarily involves use of physical force)