United States v. Williams
825 F. Supp. 2d 128
D.D.C.2011Background
- RICO Williams was convicted of one count of second degree murder and one count of witness tampering under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3), with a separate count dismissed prior to trial.
- The witness tampering charges related to a July 4, 2005 cookout during which Williams allegedly intimidated and threatened individuals to hinder their communication with law enforcement about the death of Sergeant Juwan Johnson.
- The jury received joint proposed instructions on witness tampering, which the Court later instructed per trial transcript, including the elements: intimidation, intent to hinder communication, underlying federal offense, and belief that others might communicate with authorities.
- After Fowler v. United States (2011) issued post-trial, Williams argued the instructions were incorrect under Fowler and that Count Two should have yielded an acquittal.
- The court applied the plain-error framework to Williams’ claims, noting the defense did not object at trial and determining the Fowler standard was unsettled at the time of trial.
- The court ultimately denied Williams’ Rule 29/Judgment of Acquittal and Rule 33/New Trial motions, holding the evidence supported a reasonable likelihood that a federal officer could have been contacted and CID agents qualify as federal law enforcement officers.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Fowler governs the federal nexus in § 1512(b)(3). | Williams: Fowler requires reasonable likelihood to federal officers. | Williams: Instructions were unclear but the evidence sufficed; plain error not shown. | Fowler standard applicable; court rejected plain-error claim on this point. |
| Whether the jury instructions properly required a federal law enforcement officer as the target of communication. | Williams: Instructions referred to 'law enforcement authorities' not specifically federal officers. | Instructions, read with the indictment, directed to federal authorities; no error. | No reversible error found on the federal nexus element. |
| Whether the instruction allowed a 'might have' standard rather than 'reasonable likelihood'. | Williams: The 'might' language lowered the bar below Fowler's reasonable likelihood standard. | Instruction, when viewed as a whole, required a potential federal contact; not plain error. | Error acknowledged but not plain; evidence supported a reasonable likelihood. |
| Whether CID agents qualify as federal law enforcement officers for § 1512(b)(3). | CID agents are not federal officers; no evidence of federal contact. | CID agents fall within the statutory definition of federal law enforcement officers; MEJA context supports this. | CID agents are federal law enforcement officers for § 1512(b)(3). |
Key Cases Cited
- Fowler v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2045 (2011) (requires 'reasonable likelihood' of federal contact for § 1512(a)(1)(C))
- United States v. Mouling, 557 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (plain-error assessment when law unsettled at time of trial)
- United States v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct. 2164 (2010) (plain-error standard and inquiry into substantial rights)
- United States v. Weisz, 718 F.2d 413 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (jury verdict should be sustained if rational trier could find elements beyond a reasonable doubt)