United States v. William Stivers
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 14418
| 6th Cir. | 2013Background
- Eight Clay County, Kentucky officials and associates were indicted for a RICO conspiracy (2002–2007) based on an alleged vote‑buying scheme across three election cycles; convictions followed after a seven‑week jury trial.
- Scheme allegations: candidates pooled cash, paid "vote haulers," used co‑conspiring poll workers to "vote the voter," marked voters for payment, and in 2006 stole votes from electronic machines. The Clay County Board of Elections was alleged to be the RICO enterprise.
- Several defendants held county offices (superintendent, judge, clerk, election commissioner, etc.) and were charged on multiple counts including RICO conspiracy, money‑laundering conspiracy, honest‑services mail fraud, obstruction, and vote‑buying conspiracies.
- Post‑trial motions produced partial acquittals/vacaturs (e.g., some honest‑services counts and attempted‑extortion counts); the government conceded Count 2 (money‑laundering conspiracy) rested on an invalid theory and declined to defend it on appeal.
- The Sixth Circuit found multiple significant evidentiary errors (admission of remote drug‑dealing testimony, a prejudicial TV segment, improper transcripts and omissions, unproven witness‑intimidation evidence, and admission of unredacted complaint records), concluded cumulative error deprived defendants of a fair trial, vacated convictions, and remanded for a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| RICO predicate: whether Kentucky vote‑buying statute qualifies as "bribery" under 18 U.S.C. §1961(1) | Gov: Vote buying is the type of bribery encompassed by §1961(1)(A); Model Penal Code and majority of states treat vote buying as bribery; RICO should be broadly construed. | Defs: Ky. Rev. Stat. §119.205 does not use the word "bribery" and Congress omitted federal vote‑buying statutes from §1961(1)(B), so state vote buying cannot be a RICO predicate. | Court: Vote buying under Kentucky law is an act involving bribery for RICO purposes; §1961(1)(A) is not limited by the specific federal offenses in (B). |
| Variance: whether evidence proved multiple conspiracies rather than the single enterprise charged | Defs: Evidence showed opposing factions (Adams vs. White) — at most separate conspiracies, so indictment charged a single conspiracy variances from proof. | Gov: Conspirators shared a common goal (control of elections/Board for personal benefit), overlapping participants, and interlocking conduct across cycles. | Court: Viewing evidence favorably to gov’t, a rational jury could find a single conspiracy; no fatal variance. |
| Admission of remote drug‑dealing testimony and related media (404(b)/background/403) | Defs: Testimony and TV segment about 1980s–1990s drug dealing and the Inside Edition piece were prejudicial, temporally remote, not inextricably intertwined, and used only to show propensity; should be excluded under Rules 404(b) and 403. | Gov: The testimony explained origins, relationships, and sources of cash; furnished background and rebutted anticipated impeachment; Inside Edition showed Maricle’s knowledge. | Court: Testimony about historic vote‑buying was admissible as background, but abundant, detailed drug‑dealing testimony and the TV segment were not properly tied to the charged conspiracy, were unfairly prejudicial, and admission was an abuse of discretion. |
| Use of audio transcripts and exclusion of exculpatory portions (Rule 106) | Defs: District court made unprompted substantive edits to government transcripts, left inaccurate transcriptions, failed to excise unintelligible portions, and excluded defendants’ exculpatory statements. | Gov: Court reviewed tapes and prepared usable transcripts; jurors were instructed to rely on audio over transcript. | Court: District court abused discretion by making substantive, unprompted transcript changes and failing to delete unintelligible portions; exclusion of hearsay exculpatory statements was not reversible under Rule 106 but transcript errors were prejudicial. |
| Admission of state election complaint records and Confrontation/403 concerns | Defs: Records contained testimonial hearsay (tipster complaints) admitted for their substance; Confrontation Clause and Rule 403 and Bruton problems; limiting instruction insufficient. | Gov: Records were admitted for non‑hearsay purposes (to show complaints were received and defendants’ knowledge or scheme adjustments) and were central to obstruction count; limiting instructions were given. | Court: Records were offered for non‑hearsay purposes (so no Crawford bar) but were unfairly prejudicial, minimally probative for the stated purpose, and should have been excluded under Rule 403. |
| Cumulative error and remedy | Defs: Combined errors deprived defendants of a fair trial requiring reversal. | Gov: Individual errors were harmless. | Court: The combined effect of multiple evidentiary and procedural errors was prejudicial; convictions vacated and case remanded for new trial. |
Key Cases Cited
- Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393 (Sup. Ct.) (consideration of Model Penal Code and state law in construing RICO predicates)
- Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37 (Sup. Ct.) (use of the Model Penal Code in statutory construction)
- Turkette, United States v., 452 U.S. 576 (Sup. Ct.) (RICO’s remedial purpose and broad construction)
- Licavoli v. United States, 725 F.2d 1040 (6th Cir.) (state homicide statutes as RICO predicates; rejecting coextensive reading of §1961(A) and (B))
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (Sup. Ct.) (Confrontation Clause limits on testimonial hearsay)
- Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (Sup. Ct.) (standards for judicial‑bias recusal)
- Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (Sup. Ct.) (multiple‑conspiracy/indictment variance principles)
- Nardello v. United States, 393 U.S. 286 (Sup. Ct.) (RICO predicate‑offense analysis)