United States v. William Miller
982 F.3d 412
| 6th Cir. | 2020Background
- Google’s proprietary hashing system flagged two files attached to miller694u@gmail.com as matching known child‑pornography images; Google deactivated the account and sent an automated CyberTipline report (with the files and associated IP addresses) to NCMEC.
- NCMEC’s systems automatically performed a WhoIs/geolocation lookup (Section B) and an analyst added public‑record checks and a social‑media profile printout (Section C); NCMEC forwarded the report to Kentucky law enforcement.
- Detective Schihl received the report, opened and viewed the two image files, confirmed they depicted prepubescent children, subpoenaed ISP records tying the IP to Miller’s home, obtained Google records for the account, and executed search warrants that recovered an external drive with hundreds of child‑pornography files.
- Miller was indicted on multiple §2252 counts, moved to suppress (arguing Fourth Amendment violations by Google and the police), and objected under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause to admission of the CyberTipline report.
- The district court denied suppression and admitted the report; a jury convicted Miller and he appealed, raising Fourth Amendment, Confrontation Clause, and sufficiency‑of‑the‑evidence claims.
- The Sixth Circuit affirmed: it held Google’s private hash scan was not state action, Detective Schihl’s viewing did not violate Jacobsen’s private‑search rule (given hashing reliability), and the Confrontation Clause did not bar admission of NCMEC’s automated Section B data.
Issues
| Issue | Miller's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Google’s hash‑value scan of Miller’s Gmail was a Fourth Amendment search (state action) | Google acted as a government agent or was compelled/coerced by reporting requirements, so its scan is state action | Google is a private actor acting to protect its service; reporting duties do not convert voluntary scans into government action | Not state action; Google’s scan did not violate the Fourth Amendment (Burdeau/Lugar framework) |
| Whether Detective Schihl’s warrantless viewing of the images was an unreasonable Fourth Amendment search | Schihl’s viewing was a search—either because it invaded a reasonable expectation of privacy or because it was a trespass to chattels under Jones | Jacobsen’s private‑search doctrine controls: Google’s hash match made it virtually certain Schihl would learn nothing more than Google already knew | No search in violation of Fourth Amendment under Jacobsen (hashing reliability met virtual‑certainty test) |
| Whether admission of NCMEC CyberTipline report violated the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause | The report’s location data (Section B) and analyst entries (Section C) are testimonial and Miller had no opportunity to cross‑examine the maker | Section B was machine‑generated (no human declarant); Confrontation Clause protects against testimonial human statements, not automated computer output | Confrontation Clause did not bar admission of automated Section B data; any testimonial human statements in Section C were not the basis of Miller’s Confrontation claim on appeal |
| Whether evidence was legally sufficient to convict Miller | Circumstantial evidence could implicate Miller’s brother Fred; verdict was not the only rational outcome | Records, IP tie to Miller’s residence, account registration, forensic evidence on seized drive, admissions, and other account indicators supported conviction | Evidence was sufficient; jury rationally concluded Miller, not Fred, committed the offenses |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (private‑search doctrine: gov’t search does not exceed scope if private search made it virtually certain no more would be learned)
- Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) (private party searches are generally not Fourth Amendment searches)
- United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (trespass theory: physical intrusion on property can constitute a Fourth Amendment search)
- Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877) (opening sealed mail by government is a search requiring warrant)
- Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (cell‑site records implicate privacy; did not displace Jacobsen or convert the automated third‑party lookup here into a Confrontation or Fourth Amendment win)
- Melendez‑Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009) (Confrontation Clause applies to testimonial forensic lab reports)
- Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011) (testimonial certificates require the opportunity to cross‑examine the analyst who made them)
- Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012) (plurality) (some forensic reports may be nontestimonial depending on primary purpose and solemnity)
- United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 2016) (analyzed NCMEC/AOL context; distinguished where analyst viewed more than hash‑matched image)
- United States v. Reddick, 900 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 2018) (hash‑matching reliability; detective’s viewing of matched images did not exceed private search)
- United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2015) (applied private‑search doctrine to digital files)
- United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010) (recognizes reasonable privacy expectations in email accounts)