United States v. William Clark
728 F.3d 622
7th Cir.2013Background
- William Patrick Clark, owner of a hauling subcontractor, was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(3) for submitting certified payrolls and an affidavit falsely stating employees were paid $35/hr when they were paid $13–$14/hr on a federally funded project.
- The false payrolls and affidavit were prepared and signed in St. Clair County, Illinois (Southern District of Illinois); Gateway Constructors, the general contractor and recipient, is based in the Eastern District of Missouri.
- Clark moved to dismiss for improper venue, arguing that because the documents were a condition precedent to federal jurisdiction only once submitted to the federal government (via the general contractor), venue lies only where the contractor (and the affected federal program) is situated — Eastern District of Missouri.
- The government argued venue was proper in the Southern District of Illinois because the indictment alleged Clark "made" and "used" the false documents there, and 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) permits prosecution where an offense was begun, continued, or completed.
- The district court dismissed the indictment for improper venue; the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that making the false documents in Illinois could constitute the beginning of § 1001 offenses and thus satisfy § 3237(a).
Issues
| Issue | Clark's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether venue was improper in the Southern District of Illinois for § 1001 charges | Venue lies only in the district where documents are finally submitted for federal action (Eastern District of Missouri) | Venue is proper where the false documents were made/used (Southern District of Illinois) | Reversed: making the false documents in Illinois may constitute beginning of the offense; § 3237(a) permits prosecution in that district |
| Whether § 3237(a) applies to § 1001 prosecutions here | § 3237(a) should not apply because the offense completes only upon submission to federal authorities | § 3237(a) applies because offenses may be begun in one district and completed in another | § 3237(a) applies; beginning of offense can be distinct from completion |
| Whether the "verb test" (focus on statutory verbs like "make/use") governs situs for venue | Venue should be limited to where the statute’s completion occurs, not where preparatory acts happen | The verbs "make" and "use" describe conduct that can occur in the district where documents were created; venue permissibly lies there | The verb test supports venue in Southern District of Illinois; making is an essential element and not merely preparatory |
| Whether alternative venues (e.g., Eastern District of Missouri) being proper precludes Illinois venue | If another venue is affected by the offense, only that venue is proper | Multiple districts can be proper under § 3237(a); there need not be a single exclusive situs | Rejected exclusivity; multiple proper venues possible under § 3237(a) |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Tingle, 183 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 1999) (locus delicti determined from nature of crime and location of acts)
- United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1 (1998) (location-of-offense analysis when statute silent on venue)
- United States v. Muhammad, 502 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 2007) (endorsement of the "verb test" and rejection of single-situs assumption)
- United States v. Ringer, 300 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2002) (venue for false-statement prosecutions can extend beyond where statements were uttered)
- Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631 (1961) (venue limited where statute fixes locus; distinguished here)
- United States v. Ruehrup, 333 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1964) (making of false statements in one district can be beginning of offense)
- United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275 (1999) (venue not determined solely by statutory verbs)
- United States v. Engle, 676 F.3d 405 (4th Cir. 2012) (pretrial venue challenge standard: accept indictment allegations as true)