United States v. Wilgus
638 F.3d 1274
10th Cir.2011Background
- Wilgus, not a member of a federally recognized tribe, was arrested in 1998 for possessing 141 eagle feathers; Eagle Act bans possession without a permit but contains a religious exemption for Indian tribes.
- Regulations limit permits for eagle feathers to members of federally recognized tribes, issued under 50 C.F.R. § 22.22; permits are non-transferable except within tribal or religious customs.
- RFRA defense asserts the Eagle Act burdens Wilgus' religious exercise; district court held RFRA violation, en banc remanded for least-restrictive-means analysis.
- Hardman en banc had identified two compelling interests: eagle protection and fostering Native American culture/religion, and left the precise contours to record on remand.
- Remand record showed: supply constraints at the Eagle Repository, long wait times for permits, a black market in eagle parts, and uncertain numbers of non-tribal Native adherents; two proposed alternatives were considered by the district court.
- The district court found the Eagle Act's tribal-permit limitation was not the least restrictive means and proposed broader access or new transfer rules, which the Tenth Circuit later evaluated.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| RFRA compels least restrictive means in this context | Wilgus contends Eagle Act regulation is not the least restrictive means. | U.S. contends existing tribal-permit scheme is narrowly tailored and least restrictive. | Existing tribal-permit scheme is least restrictive. |
| Proper compelling interests under RFRA | Wilgus argues RFRA requires protection of his Native American religious practice as burdened by the Eagle Act. | U.S. asserts two compelling interests: eagle protection and preserving federally recognized tribal culture/religion. | Two compelling interests recognized: eagle protection and preservation of federally-recognized tribal culture/religion. |
| Scope of the federally-recognized-tribes interest | Wilgus's position could extend benefits beyond tribes. | Court should adopt tribes-based framing consistent with Morton and Hardman. | Court adopts federally-recognized-tribes framing for the compelling interest. |
| Evaluation of alternatives on remand | Opening permits to all Native practitioners or allowing tribal gifts to non-members could lessen burdens. | Those alternatives would undermine tribal interests or enforcement and are not less restrictive. | Neither alternative satisfies RFRA; they would not advance compelling interests as effectively as the existing scheme. |
| Appellate standard of review and factual record | Record supports remand conclusions about least-restrictive means. | Record supports government’s chosen framework as least restrictive. | De novo review with independent examination confirms existing scheme is least restrictive. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hardman v. United States, 297 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc: RFRA, two compelling interests, remand for least-restrictive-means)
- Friday v. People of the State of Colorado, 525 F.3d 946 (10th Cir. 2008) (RFRA de novo review; constitutional facts concept)
- Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (U.S. 1974) (tribal-political status; sovereign-like relationship; governing rationale)
- United States v. Antoine, 318 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2003) (RFRA and tribal-relations defense; tribal-interest framing)
- Gibson v. Babbitt, 223 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2000) (RFRA challenges to Native American religious exemptions)
- City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (U.S. 1997) (RFRA constitutional limitations on application to states)