398 F.Supp.3d 785
D. Idaho2019Background
- Federal agents executed a valid search warrant at a residence investigating possession of child pornography and seized a locked Google Pixel 3 XL found in a bathroom.
- The phone could be unlocked by passcode or fingerprint; biometric unlocking via fingerprint works for 48 hours since last unlock.
- After seizure, the government sought a supplemental warrant authorizing officers to compel the subject to press any finger/thumb to the phone’s fingerprint sensor to unlock it.
- A Magistrate Judge denied that supplemental warrant, concluding compelling a fingerprint to unlock the phone would violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination (and thus the Fourth Amendment).
- The government moved for district-court review; the district court found the issue moot for the particular phone (biometric window expired) but entertained the case under the ‘‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’’ exception.
- On the merits the district court vacated the magistrate judge’s order and granted the government’s motion, holding that compelling a fingerprint is non-testimonial and does not violate the Fifth Amendment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether compelling a suspect to provide a fingerprint to unlock a phone violates the Fifth Amendment | Government: fingerprint is a physical characteristic (non-testimonial); no Fifth Amendment violation | Individual/Magistrate: compelled fingerprint is testimonial authentication and self-incriminating | Court: No Fifth Amendment violation; fingerprint is non-testimonial |
| Whether the case is moot and reviewable | Government: exception applies — capable of repetition yet evading review; district review appropriate | Implicit: issue moot for this device because fingerprint window expired | Court: Moot as to this phone but exception applies, so decision on merits allowed |
| Whether compelling biometric unlock also violates Fourth Amendment | Government: if no Fifth Amendment problem, the search is reasonable under warrant | Magistrate: Fifth Amendment violation would make the search unreasonable under Fourth Amendment | Court: Because no Fifth Amendment violation, the compelled biometric search under warrant comports with Fourth Amendment reasonableness |
| Whether a district split in the district of Idaho justified review as well | Government: magistrate rulings show split warranting district review | Court/defense: no published contrary decisions; magistrate signings alone not a reasoned split | Court: Declined to rely on a claimed intra-district split; decided on merits via mootness exception |
Key Cases Cited
- Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988) (distinguishes surrender of physical key from compelled disclosure of a combination; testimonial inquiry centers on contents of the mind)
- United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000) (explains testimonial vs. physical-act distinction under the Fifth Amendment)
- Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177 (2004) (defines elements of Fifth Amendment privilege: testimonial, incriminating, compelled)
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (compelled physical samples such as blood held non-testimonial)
- United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (compelled fingerprints, photographs, voice exemplars treated as non-testimonial)
- Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (foregone-conclusion doctrine: government may subpoena documents when existence/possession are a foregone conclusion)
- Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (discusses compelled authentication and testimonial evidence)
- County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (1979) (mootness principles for equitable relief)
