United States v. Wetmore, 812 F.3d 245

Background

Joel Wetmore, civilly committed under the Adam Walsh Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 4247–4248) after convictions for sexual offenses involving minors and child pornography, sought release from civil commitment under 18 U.S.C. § 4247(h).
Wetmore was committed following a bench trial; the district court previously found him "sexually dangerous" by clear and convincing evidence and ordered civil commitment.
While confined at FCI-Butner, Wetmore participated in treatment and obtained a forensic reevaluation by Dr. Joseph Plaud, who later concluded Wetmore was no longer sexually dangerous.
At the § 4247(h) release hearing, Wetmore presented Dr. Plaud and lay witnesses; the government presented Dr. Andres Hernandez and Dr. Dawn Graney, who testified Wetmore remained sexually dangerous.
The district court, after assessing witness credibility and the conflicting expert testimony, concluded Wetmore failed to show by a preponderance that he was no longer sexually dangerous and denied release.
On appeal the First Circuit addressed (1) which party bears the burden of proof at a § 4247(h) release hearing and (2) whether the district court erred in denying Wetmore’s release petition.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Who bears burden of proof at a § 4247(h) release hearing?	Wetmore implicitly argued he satisfied release criteria (i.e., no longer sexually dangerous); did not contend the government must prove continued dangerousness.	Government argued the petitioner (committed person) must prove by preponderance that he is no longer sexually dangerous.	Petitioner seeking release bears the burden: must prove by a preponderance he is no longer sexually dangerous.
Was the district court’s factual finding (Wetmore remains sexually dangerous) clearly erroneous?	Wetmore argued Dr. Plaud’s opinion and other evidence showed he can safely reenter the community.	Government relied on Drs. Graney and Hernandez and other record evidence to show continuing dangerousness.	No clear error: district court’s credibility determinations and factual findings were plausible and supported by the record; denial of release affirmed.
Proper standard of proof for initial civil commitment vs. release?	(Background implication) Wetmore highlighted improvement through treatment.	Government noted initial commitment required clear and convincing evidence; release statute uses preponderance for a finding that person will not be sexually dangerous.	Court clarified initial commitment requires clear and convincing evidence; release requires petitioner to prove by preponderance he is not sexually dangerous.
Deference to trial court on dueling expert testimony	Wetmore urged appellate reweighing in light of Dr. Plaud’s conclusion.	Government argued district court had superior vantage to assess experts and credibility.	Appellate court defers to district court on credibility and factual choices where evidence supports plausible conflicting inferences.

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Volungus, 595 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010) (allocation of burden on government for initial civil commitment proceedings)
United States v. Shields, 649 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011) (discussing proof standard for civil commitment under the Adam Walsh Act)
In re Brady-Zell (DeBenedictis), 756 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2014) (appellate deference to trial court factfinding and concise opinions)
United States v. Espinoza, 490 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 2007) (deference to trial court’s credibility assessments)
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985) (appellate review limits on reweighing conflicting evidence)
Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir. 1979) (principle that party seeking affirmative relief bears burden of proof)
United States v. Wetmore, 700 F.3d 570 (1st Cir. 2012) (prior appellate history related to Wetmore’s commitment)
United States v. Wetmore, 766 F. Supp. 2d 319 (D. Mass. 2011) (district court’s original civil commitment decision)