United States v. Westbrook
5:19-cr-00050
| E.D. Ky. | Jul 2, 2019Background
- June 23, 2018 traffic stop: Officer Webster followed Westbrook after observing short-duration stops at a Waffle House and Motel 6 in a high-narcotics area, then saw two failures to signal and initiated a stop; body camera was turned on after the stop began.
- During the traffic stop Webster smelled marijuana, obtained consent to search the vehicle, and found a firearm, suspected methamphetamine and marijuana, scales, baggies, phones, and extra magazines; Westbrook arrested.
- After release on bail, officers located Westbrook at Miyako Sushi on August 31, 2018; they arrested him as he exited to avoid a disturbance and searched him incident to arrest, finding drugs, pills, and cash.
- Officers intended a K-9 sniff of Westbrook’s vehicle, but narcotics found on his person contaminated the vehicle scent; officers sought consent to search the car but Westbrook initially refused.
- While at the scene, after being told the vehicle would be towed and a warrant sought, Westbrook initiated questions about whether his wife could take the car; he volunteered that a firearm and money were in the vehicle; officers then searched the car (seizing $11,200 and a stolen firearm) and questioned him further after transporting him to the station.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Legality of June 23 traffic stop | Stop was lawful based on observed traffic violations (failure to signal) and officer’s corroborated testimony | Stop was pretextual; officer’s subjective intent matters because only officer testified to the infractions | Stop was lawful: officer’s testimony credible, bodycam corroboration, subjective intent immaterial under Whren; deny suppression |
| Whether pre‑Miranda questioning at Miyako elicited statements requiring suppression | Pre‑Miranda question “Is there anything in there that shouldn’t be in there?” was interrogation but produced no incriminating response; later statements were voluntary or post‑Miranda | Pre‑Miranda questioning and subsequent questioning produced incriminating statements and tainted consents/search | Pre‑Miranda question produced no incriminating response; later incriminating statements were voluntary, in response to Westbrook’s own initiated questions and were post‑Miranda when material answers were elicited; deny suppression |
| Lawfulness of vehicle search at Miyako (consent/automobile exception) | Search was lawful because Westbrook’s statements and officers’ knowledge (felon status) provided probable cause for automobile search | No valid consent; vehicle search was warrantless and therefore unlawful absent probable cause | Search was lawful under automobile exception: Westbrook’s volunteered statement that a firearm was in the car + knowledge he was a felon supplied probable cause; deny suppression |
Key Cases Cited
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (Sup. Ct. 1996) (officer’s subjective intent irrelevant where probable cause for traffic violation exists)
- Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (government bears burden to justify stops)
- Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (fruits of unlawful searches/seizures are excluded)
- Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (Miranda covers express questioning and its functional equivalent)
- Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (government must prove voluntariness of confessions)
- United States v. Pacheco-Lopez, 531 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2008) (post‑warning statements may be suppressed when part of a continuous unwarned interrogation)
- United States v. Lumpkin, 159 F.3d 983 (6th Cir. 1998) (automobile exception permits warrantless vehicle searches when probable cause exists)