United States v. Wesley Coonce, Jr., 932 F.3d 623

Wesley Paul Coonce, Jr., a federal inmate serving life, was convicted of murdering fellow inmate Victor Castro‑Rodriguez at FMC Springfield; physical, DNA, camera, and multiple inculpatory admissions supported guilt.
Castro was found bound and asphyxiated; pathologist opined death by blunt force compression of the larynx consistent with being stood on.
Indictment charged first‑degree murder and murder by a federal prisoner, with statutory and non‑statutory aggravating factors making the case capital; jury convicted and recommended death.
Defense presented 33 mitigating factors (26 submitted to jury) focusing on severe childhood abuse, mental/brain‑injury evidence, suicide attempts, and limited role claims; jury found only one mitigating factor unanimously but imposed death after weighing.
On appeal Coonce raised 16 issues, including Atkins (intellectual disability/age‑of‑onset), evidentiary and Confrontation Clause claims, jury instruction and voir dire challenges, and challenges to the validity and use of future dangerousness as an aggravator.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Coonce)	Defendant's Argument (Government)	Held
Atkins / age‑of‑onset for intellectual disability	Onset need not be strictly before 18; Hall v. Florida supports eliminating rigid cutoffs	At time FDPA enacted clinical consensus required onset before 18; precedent controls	Age‑of‑onset remains before 18; no Atkins relief granted
Admission of refusal to take IQ test / Miranda	Refusal at competency exam was protected like Miranda silence; prosecutor misstated IQ reliability	Competency exam warnings differ from Miranda; comments about IQ not prosecutorial misconduct	No Miranda violation; prosecutor’s remarks not reversible misconduct
Use of compelled psychiatric exam statements (Dr. Park Dietz)	Statements about the offense were compelled and inadmissible under Fifth Amendment	Rules (Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.2) allow limited government exam/rebuttal; defendant invited error by agreeing to scope	Admission was invited error/within Rule 12.2 protections; no reversible error
Future dangerousness as aggravating factor	Probability‑based prediction cannot meet beyond‑reasonable‑doubt, should be confined to in‑prison risk, or is unreliable to support death	Jurek and circuit precedent permit probability‑based future dangerousness; jury informed of life sentence	Future dangerousness is a valid aggravator; no reversible error in submission

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (protects right against compelled self‑incrimination during custodial interrogation)
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (death penalty unconstitutional for intellectually disabled defendants)
Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014) (limitations on rigid IQ cutoffs under Atkins)
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality permitting future‑dangerousness predictions in death cases)
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) (permitting non‑confrontational fact‑finding in capital sentencing)
Kansas v. Carr, 136 S. Ct. 633 (2016) (permitting joint capital sentencing and rejecting categorical severance rule)
United States v. Purkey, 428 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005) (standards for admissibility and review in FDPA sentencing)
Kansas v. Cheever, 571 U.S. 87 (2013) (bounds on compelled psychiatric evidence use when defendant raises mental‑status defenses)
Abdul‑Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233 (2007) (prohibits requiring nexus between mitigating evidence and crime)