United States v. Weir
2:18-cr-00108
W.D. Wash.Jul 19, 2019Background
- Anthony Weir previously pled guilty in 2002 to multiple child-sex offenses and was sentenced to 210 months imprisonment and five years supervised release; his supervision began October 2015.
- A probation-office search on November 8, 2017 uncovered 23 images on a microSD card depicting pre‑pubescent children; genitalia not clearly discernable but some images focus on pubic region and are taken in bedroom/bathroom settings.
- A federal grand jury indicted Weir on May 2, 2018 for possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).
- Weir moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing the statute is unconstitutionally vague (facially and as applied), overbroad, and that the court lacks subject‑matter jurisdiction; he also invoked the rule of lenity.
- The court reviewed images in camera and considered whether they meet the statutory definition of “sexually explicit conduct,” focusing on the lascivious‑exhibition element and applying Dost factors.
- The court denied the motion, holding the statute is not vague or overbroad as applied, Congress acted within Commerce Clause power, and lenity does not apply.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vagueness of “lascivious” | Statute gives adequate notice; prior precedent supports clarity | Term “lascivious” is vague facially and as applied; he lacked notice images were proscribed | Court: Not vague; Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent reject vagueness; question of images is factual, not basis to dismiss indictment |
| Overbreadth | Protecting children justifies statute; legitimate applications substantial | Statute criminalizes protected expression and chills speech | Court: Overbreadth challenge fails; statute’s legitimate applications predominate |
| Subject‑matter jurisdiction (Commerce Clause) | Federal interest in regulating child pornography affects interstate commerce | Statute exceeds Congress’s Commerce power for intrastate possession | Court: Congress acted within Commerce Clause; jurisdiction proper |
| Rule of lenity | Not applicable because statute is clear | Ambiguities should be resolved in defendant’s favor | Court: No grievous ambiguity; lenity inapplicable |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir.) (upholding non‑vagueness of “lascivious”)
- United States v. Adams, 343 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir.) (applying Ferber analysis to § 2256 and rejecting overbreadth and Commerce Clause challenges)
- United States v. X‑Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994) (rejecting vagueness challenge to § 2256)
- United States v. Overton, 573 F.3d 679 (9th Cir.) (endorsing Dost factors as starting point)
- Dost v. United States, 636 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Cal.) (articulating the six Dost factors for lasciviousness)
- United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008) (explaining close statutory cases are for proof, not vagueness dismissal)
- New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (addressing overbreadth in child‑pornography context)
- United States v. Gallenardo, 579 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir.) (upholding federal jurisdiction over child‑pornography possession)
- Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (void‑for‑vagueness principle requiring minimal guidelines)
