United States v. Webb
166 F. Supp. 3d 1198
W.D. Wash.2016Background
- Defendant Jamell Webb charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) as an armed career criminal based on four prior convictions, including two Washington state drug conspiracy convictions (pleaded in 2008) and a federal possession-with-intent conviction (admitted as an ACCA predicate).
- Government sought ACCA enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) requiring three prior violent felonies or serious drug offenses; parties agreed the federal drug conviction counts but disputed whether the two Washington conspiracy convictions qualify as “serious drug offenses.”
- Webb argued the state conspiracy convictions are not ACCA predicates because (1) Washington delivery statute is broader than federal law, (2) state convictions carried only a 12‑month exposure (less than ACCA’s 10‑year max), and (3) Washington allows conspiracy with a government agent (raised at oral argument).
- Court applied the Taylor categorical approach: compare statutory elements of the state offenses to the federal equivalents, looking to state-court interpretations where statutory language is unclear.
- Washington authority (Pineda‑Pineda and Pacheco) was interpreted to mean the state conspiracy statutes can be convicted when the co‑conspirator is a government agent (i.e., the bilateral agreement element can be satisfied despite government involvement), so the state statutes sweep more broadly than federal conspiracy law (which disallows a unilateral conspiracy with an agent).
- Because the Washington conspiracy statutes are not a categorical match with federal drug conspiracy law, Webb’s two state convictions cannot serve as ACCA predicates; the court granted Webb’s motion and dismissed the ACCA allegation from Count I.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Webb’s Washington drug conspiracy convictions are "serious drug offenses" under ACCA | Government: the convictions involve distribution and thus qualify under §924(e)(2)(A)(ii); the statutory term "involving" is broad and captures conspiracies | Webb: Washington statutes are broader than federal law (e.g., permit conspiracy with govt. agent), so they do not categorically match ACCA predicates | Held: No — state conspiracy statutes are broader and therefore not ACCA predicates |
| Whether Washington allows conviction for conspiracy when the co‑conspirator is a government agent | Government: Pineda‑Pineda and later practice support treating RCW conspiracy statutes as aligned with general conspiracy law; agent involvement does not necessarily preclude conviction | Webb: Under federal law and his view of Washington law, conspiring with an agent cannot satisfy conspiracy element; thus state conviction is broader | Held: Court finds Washington precedent allows conviction despite government agent involvement, making the state statute broader than federal law |
| Whether the word "involving" in §924(e) obviates the categorical approach | Government: "Involving" is expansive and captures attempts and conspiracies | Webb: The categorical approach still controls; expansive language does not override element‑based comparison | Held: The court agrees categorical approach remains required; "involving" does not salvage a non‑categorical match |
| Whether the modified categorical approach could rescue the state convictions | Government: not argued as dispositive here | Webb: N/A | Held: Not applicable — state statutes are indivisible, so modified categorical approach cannot be used |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (categorical approach for predicate offenses under federal sentencing statutes)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (limits when modified categorical approach may be used)
- United States v. Kelly, 422 F.3d 889 (9th Cir.) (applying categorical approach to state guilty pleas)
- United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10 (federal drug conspiracy governed by federal common law)
- United States v. Pallares‑Galan, 359 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir.) (statute broader than federal provision cannot be used as predicate)
- United States v. Escobar de Bright, 742 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir.) (cannot conspire with government agent under federal law)
- State v. Pineda‑Pineda, 154 Wash. App. 653 (Wash. Ct. App.) (interpreting controlled‑substance conspiracy statute alongside general conspiracy statute)