975 F.3d 94
2d Cir.2020Background
- Syracuse PD officers in an unmarked vehicle observed Calvin Weaver earlier that evening: he stared at the car and later tugged at his waistband while walking toward a gray sedan in a high‑crime neighborhood.
- Officers stopped the sedan for a signaling violation; a rear passenger briefly opened his door into traffic and appeared ready to flee.
- Officer Tom observed Weaver in the front passenger seat pushing down at his pelvic area and squirming; Tom ordered Weaver out, asked to see his hands/ID, and then instructed him to place his hands on the trunk with legs spread.
- Weaver initially hindered effective pat‑frisks by pressing his pelvis against the car; after being repositioned and handcuffed, officers felt a bulge (cocaine) and then, during the pat frisk, a hard object later identified as a loaded handgun in the groin area.
- Weaver was charged federally; he moved to suppress the firearm as the fruit of an unconstitutional frisk. The district court denied suppression; on appeal the Second Circuit majority reversed and remanded, holding the frisk lacked the required reasonable suspicion that Weaver was armed and dangerous. Chief Judge Livingston dissented; Judge Calabresi concurred.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Weaver) | Defendant's Argument (Gov't) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officers had articulable, objective reasonable suspicion that Weaver was "armed and dangerous" to justify a Terry frisk | Weaver: Officers only had ambiguous indicators (staring, waistband tug, furtive motion, statement "I don't got nothin'", presence in high‑crime area) that he hid contraband, not a weapon — frisk unlawful | Gov't: Totality of facts (stare, waistband adjustment, pelvic pushing/squirming, passenger’s door behavior, high‑crime area, evasive conduct) gave reasonable suspicion that Weaver might be armed and dangerous | Held: Reversed — officers lacked an objectively reasonable belief that Weaver was armed and dangerous; frisk unconstitutional; firearm suppressed |
| When did the frisk legally "incept" for assessing reasonable suspicion? | Weaver: Reasonable‑suspicion requirement applies at the moment the frisk was initiated (when officer ordered hands on trunk/feet spread) | Gov't: The court may consider subsequent conduct (e.g., Weaver obstructing the frisk) as part of the justification | Held: Majority: frisk effectively began when Officer Tom ordered Weaver to assume the spread‑eagle "in search" position, so only facts known by then may justify the frisk; later conduct cannot retroactively cure lack of reasonable suspicion (dissent disagreed) |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (establishes stop‑and‑frisk: officers may pat down when they reasonably suspect a person is armed and dangerous)
- Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (extends Terry to vehicle passenger‑compartment searches; requires articulable, objective belief of danger)
- Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (allows ordering driver out of vehicle during traffic stop; emphasizes officer safety)
- Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997) (permits officers to order passengers out of lawfully stopped vehicles)
- Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009) (applies Terry standard to passenger frisks during traffic stops)
- United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) (totality‑of‑circumstances approach; prohibits piecemeal discounting of factors)
- United States v. Hussain, 835 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 2016) (suspicion that someone is hiding something is insufficient absent facts suggesting dangerousness)
- United States v. Padilla, 548 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2008) (upheld frisk where waistband adjustment was distinctive and tied to officer experience suggesting a gun)
- Dancy v. McGinley, 843 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2016) (timing of seizures/searches evaluated by what a reasonable person would perceive; limits to considering post‑initiation facts)
- United States v. Santillan, 902 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2018) (review standard: view facts through eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer; totality of circumstances)
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (officer's subjective intent irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analysis)
- Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996) (appellate courts must give due weight to inferences of on‑scene officers when assessing reasonable suspicion)
- Sokolow v. Florida, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) (degree of suspicion attaches to types of noncriminal acts; totality analysis for reasonable suspicion)