United States v. Wayne Stoker
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 2239
| 5th Cir. | 2013Background
- Stoker was convicted by a jury of 18 U.S.C. §1513(e) retaliation against a witness and §876(c) mailing a threatening communication.
- Evidence showed he mailed the Moore ROI from prison, which Moore interpreted as a threat and which caused emotional distress.
- PSR added two arson convictions to this case, yielding a career-offender calculation under §4B1.1.
- District court treated all four convictions as crimes of violence, resulting in a 108-month sentence consecutive to another arson sentence.
- Stoker challenges both the sufficiency of the evidence and the career-offender enhancement, arguing flaws in the §4B1.2 analysis.
- Opinion affirms sufficiency of the convictions, vacates the sentence, and remands for resentencing as a career offender based on the §876(c) conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence | Stoker lacked retaliatory intent for §1513(e) and lacked threat intent for §876(c). | Stoker argues the evidence fails to prove intentional retaliation and threat. | Evidence sufficient to support both counts. |
| Element clause for §4B1.2(a)(1) | Retaliation lacks the use or threatened use of physical force as an element. | Threat to injure Moore is implicit in the §876(c) count and may meet the element clause. | §1513(e) does not satisfy the element clause for crime of violence. |
| Residual clause §4B1.2(a)(2) applicability to §1513(e) | Retaliation may fall within the residual clause as conduct presenting serious risk. | Retaliation as charged does not necessarily present a serious potential risk of physical injury. | Retaliation conviction does not qualify under the residual clause. |
| Residual clause applicability to §876(c) and overall career-offender determination | The instant offense, when viewed with the whole record, may qualify as a crime of violence for career-offender purposes. | Only the §876(c) element supports a qualifying offense, justifying career-offender status. | The court remands for resentencing as a career offender based on §876(c) together with appropriate adjustments. |
| Remand and sentence | Error in sentencing requires correction and proper application of §4B1.1 with the correct qualifying offense. | No position stated beyond the need to recalculate under correct guidelines. | Conviction affirmed; sentence vacated and remanded for resentencing as a career offender. |
Key Cases Cited
- Maggitt, 784 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1986) (circumstantial proof of intent may support retaliatory intent)
- United States v. Salazar, 542 F.3d 139 (5th Cir. 2008) (weight and credibility of evidence for guilty verdicts)
- United States v. Percel, 553 F.3d 903 (5th Cir. 2008) (reviewing sufficiency of the evidence on appeal)
- United States v. McDowell, 498 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 2007) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
- United States v. Guevara, 408 F.3d 252 (5th Cir. 2005) ( §876(c) as crime of violence under §4B1.2(a)(1))
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008) (limits on residual clause similarity to enumerated offenses)
- Montgomery v. United States, 402 F.3d 482 (5th Cir. 2005) (retaliation statutes and residual-clause analysis)
- Mohr v. United States, 554 F.3d 604 (5th Cir. 2009) (modified categorical approach to residual clause)
- Lipscomb v. United States, 619 F.3d 474 (5th Cir. 2010) (conduct set forth in the count may govern residual-clause application)
- James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007) (ACCA residual clause and violent felonies guidance)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (categorical approach to crime-of-violence determinations)