United States v. Wasylyshyn, 979 F.3d 165

Dr. Marina Wasylyshyn entered the Binghamton federal courthouse to retrieve tax forms; CSOs told her the IRS office required an appointment and would not accept walk-ins.
An exchange escalated: Wasylyshyn slammed her purse, shouted at CSOs, was heard from ~40–45 feet away, and stepped very close to a CSO (video showed close contact).
CSO Canfield arrested Wasylyshyn; FPS Inspector Chapman issued a violation notice under 41 C.F.R. § 102-74.390(a) (prohibiting conduct that "creates loud or unusual noise or a nuisance").
Magistrate judge convicted Wasylyshyn after a bench trial; the district court affirmed on initial appeal. She appealed to the Second Circuit raising three principal challenges.
On appeal Wasylyshyn argued (1) the Noise Regulation was not conspicuously posted (statutory notice), (2) the government failed to prove the required mens rea (she lacked knowledge that her action was wrongful), and (3) the regulation is unconstitutionally vague as applied.
The Second Circuit affirmed: the posting/notice claim was forfeited for failure to raise it below; mens rea is a general-intent requirement and the evidence sufficed; the regulation is not vague as applied to her conduct in a courthouse.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Statutory notice / conspicuous posting of 40 U.S.C. § 1315 regulations	Regulations were posted at courthouse entrance; posting satisfied statutory requirement	Posting illegible from public position; she lacked notice that conduct was prohibited	Forfeited/waived: defendant did not raise posting challenge before district court, so Second Circuit declined to consider it
Mens rea required to violate 41 C.F.R. § 102-74.390(a)	General intent suffices: government must prove knowledge of the actus reus (i.e., knowingly creating loud/unusual noise or nuisance)	Regulation requires knowledge that conduct was wrongful (specific culpability); she lacked that knowledge	Held: mens rea is general intent per United States v. Weintraub; evidence (shouting, continuing after being told to calm down, close physical contact) satisfied it
Vagueness (as-applied)	Regulation gives adequate notice in the courthouse context; enforcement here was not arbitrary	Terms like "loud," "unusual," and "nuisance" are vague; allows arbitrary/content-based enforcement	Held: not unconstitutionally vague as applied. In the courthouse context the terms give adequate notice and her conduct falls within the regulation’s core prohibitions

United States v. Weintraub, 273 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2001) (presumes a mens rea and reads criminal regulations to require knowledge of facts distinguishing culpable from innocent conduct)
Bronx Reptiles, Inc. v. United States, 217 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2000) (criminal statutes are presumed to contain a mens rea requirement)
Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000) (distinguishing general-intent requirement as knowledge of the actus reus)
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (striking ordinance for vagueness where standard depended on what "annoys" passersby)
Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2006) (framework for vagueness challenges: notice and risk of arbitrary enforcement)