United States v. Washington, 596 U.S. 832

Background

Hanford is a federal nuclear cleanup site in Washington where most labor is performed by private contractors under federal contract; the federal government pays many contractor workers’ compensation claims.
In 2018 Washington enacted a workers’ compensation provision (Wash. Rev. Code §51.32.187) that applied only to workers at Hanford “engaged … for the United States,” which in practice covered federal contract workers but not federal employees.
The statute created a rebuttable presumption (clear and convincing standard) that certain diseases and illnesses were caused by Hanford work and extended that presumption for life, making it easier for covered contractors to obtain benefits.
The United States sued, arguing the law facially discriminated against the Federal Government and its contractors in violation of the Supremacy Clause and intergovernmental-immunity doctrines; the District Court and Ninth Circuit upheld the law based on a statutory waiver, 40 U.S.C. §3172.
After certiorari was granted, Washington amended the law to expand coverage beyond federal contractors, but the Supreme Court held the case was not moot because it could still grant effectual relief (e.g., recoupment of payments) and declined to interpret the new state statute in the first instance.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (United States)	Defendant's Argument (Washington)	Held
Mootness: Did Washington’s post-cert amendment moot the case?	Not moot — Court can still grant effectual relief (money at stake; some claims not final).	Moot — new statute eliminates federal-only coverage and retroactively covers claims.	Not moot — possible relief remains; Court will not interpret state statute first.
Does the state law violate the Supremacy Clause by discriminating against the Federal Government/contractors?	Yes — law facially singles out federal workers/contractors and imposes costs federal government does not bear.	No — state may apply its workers’ compensation scheme to federal projects under state law.	Yes — the statute discriminates on its face and thus violates intergovernmental-immunity unless Congress waived immunity.
Does 40 U.S.C. §3172(a) clearly and unambiguously waive the Federal Government’s immunity to permit discriminatory state laws on federal lands/projects?	No — waiver language must be read narrowly; §3172 does not clearly authorize facial discrimination against the Federal Government.	Yes — §3172 permits states to apply their workers’ compensation laws to federal premises “as if” under exclusive jurisdiction, effecting a complete waiver.	No — §3172 can reasonably be read as allowing only extension of generally applicable state workers’ compensation laws, not laws that single out the Federal Government; waiver not clear and unambiguous.
Do prior precedents (e.g., Goodyear Atomic) require a broader reading of §3172?	Goodyear does not authorize explicit discrimination; waivers interpreted narrowly for discriminatory laws.	Goodyear and similar cases support application of state workers’ compensation on federal sites generally.	Goodyear concerned substantive scope of “workers’ compensation laws” but did not address explicit discriminatory laws; it does not support Washington’s facial discrimination.

Key Cases Cited

McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819) (establishes that states may not impede or control federal operations under Supremacy Clause)
United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452 (1977) (discusses costs imposed on federal government and principles of intergovernmental immunity)
Washington v. United States, 460 U.S. 536 (1983) (a law discriminates when it singles out the federal government for unfavorable treatment)
North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423 (1990) (plurality opinion addressing regulation or discrimination against the United States or its contractors)
Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174 (1988) (interprets scope of predecessors to §3172 regarding application of state workers’ compensation to federal facilities)
Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976) (stating waivers of federal immunity require clear congressional mandate)
South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988) (discusses limits of state regulation over federal interests under the Supremacy Clause)
FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284 (2012) (noting statutes do not unequivocally waive federal immunity where alternative readings are plausible)