United States v. Walter Ray Hamilton
709 F. App'x 632
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- Hamilton leased and operated a Chamblee, GA home as a stash house for a drug trafficking organization.
- DEA agents observed Hamilton unloading boxes into the stash house and his codefendants leaving with a container; a traffic stop of those codefendants uncovered 3.996 kg of cocaine.
- Agents later stopped cars linked to Hamilton and found 6 kg of marijuana in one car, 55 kg of marijuana in other cars, and 4.4 kg of marijuana in the stash house; a package tied to tracking numbers on a list contained 10 kg of marijuana.
- The PSR aggregated the seized cocaine and marijuana to calculate Hamilton’s offense level, producing a Guidelines range of 87–108 months.
- Hamilton objected to including the 3.996 kg of cocaine, arguing he only participated in marijuana trafficking and had no personal involvement with the cocaine. The district court overruled the objection, concluding the cocaine was attributable as relevant conduct; Hamilton was sentenced to 75 months.
- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the sentence but remanded for clerical corrections to the judgment regarding counts and supervised-release terms.
Issues
| Issue | Hamilton's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court erred in attributing 3.996 kg of cocaine to Hamilton under USSG § 1B1.3 | Hamilton argued he had no contact with the cocaine and only participated in marijuana trafficking, so cocaine should not be attributed to him | The government argued Hamilton ran the stash house and aided/abetted trafficking there, making the cocaine his own relevant conduct under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) (aiding and abetting) or, alternatively, joint activity under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) | Court held cocaine was properly attributed under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) because Hamilton’s own conduct (leasing, running, unloading boxes) aided the trafficking; foreseeability of co-conspirators’ conduct was immaterial |
| Whether reasonable foreseeability was required to hold Hamilton accountable for the cocaine | Hamilton contended cocaine was not reasonably foreseeable as part of the conspiracy | Government maintained foreseeability is irrelevant if defendant is accountable for his own acts aiding the crime | Court held foreseeability applies only to others’ conduct; because Hamilton aided the trafficking, foreseeability was immaterial |
| Procedural: Whether judgment contained clerical errors needing correction | Hamilton noted inconsistencies between plea, counts, and supervised-release terms | Government requested Rule 36 correction to align judgment with sentencing colloquy and plea | Court remanded for limited clerical corrections to reflect the guilty plea to Count One as to marijuana (not cocaine) and concurrent supervised-release terms |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. McCrimmon, 362 F.3d 725 (11th Cir. 2004) (standard of review for application of § 1B1.3)
- United States v. Alvarez-Coria, 447 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2006) (defendant accountable for his own conduct; foreseeability applies only to co‑conspirators)
- United States v. Gomez, 905 F.2d 1513 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that aiding and abetting can make defendant accountable for drugs handled through a stash house)